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SUMMARY
In this paper we develop a set of regimes that link 
structures of economic growth with those of social 
reproduction. We then link these regimes to groups 
of countries organized by economic structure and 
level of development and evaluate the macroeco-
nomic consequences of a decline in gender inequality 
in the labour market. Social reproduction is defined 
in terms of the time and money it takes to produce, 
maintain and invest in the labour force, so it includes 
both paid and unpaid care work. The analytical em-
phasis is on how the distributions of production and 
reproduction among women, men, the state and 
capital determine investment and growth and how 
gender inequality is both cause and consequence of 
these relationships. 
We begin by developing a conceptual macroeconomic 
model of growth and social reproduction. Our overall 
approach to the macroeconomy is what economists 
term ‘structuralist’ in the sense that the distribu-
tion of income plays a central role in aggregate 
demand, investment and growth, and the structure 
of the economy is an important determinant of how 
these interactions play out. Social reproduction is 
incorporated into this model by treating labour as 
a produced means of production. Primarily women 
(but also men) carry out this reproduction process by 
doing both paid and unpaid work. A key goal is to dif-
ferentiate between societies that care more and/or 
better than societies that care less. The reason could 
be social norms around intergenerational obligation 
that induce altruistic preferences; strong social wel-
fare sectors that create highly skilled and well-paid 
jobs in the care sector; or, more likely, gendered ideals 
that encourage women to provide high-quality care 
for little or no pay. 
The result is a two-by-two matrix that links macro 
mechanisms of growth with those of the distribu-
tion of social reproduction. In terms of growth, we 
differentiate between what we term low- and high-
caring spirit economies by capturing the relationship 
between wages, investments in human beings and 
economic growth. In high-caring spirit economies, 
higher wages are associated with increased invest-
ments in human capacities, raising long-term growth 
possibilities. In low-caring spirit economies, the 
impact of higher wages on investment is not strong 
enough to counter the negative impact on profits, 
and growth suffers as a result. The social reproduc-
tion side also involves two stylized cases: The low 
road corresponds to a feminization of responsibility 
and obligation, while the high road is characterized 
by a more equal, gender egalitarian distribution of 
the time and monetary costs of social reproduction. 
Putting the four cases together, we have a set of 
four stylized regimes: time squeeze, mutual, wage 
squeeze and exploitation. In the time squeeze case, 
higher wages for women are good for growth, but 
more labour market participation squeezes time 
and lowers human capacities production, result-
ing in growth that is elusive or unstable. In the 
mutual case, higher wages for women are good for 
growth, more market participation increases human 
capacities production and thus growth and social 
reproduction reinforce one another. In the exploita-
tion case, higher wages for women lower growth, 
more market participation squeezes time and lowers 
human capacities production and growth is partly 
based on exploiting women’s labour and human 
resources. In the final case, wage squeeze, higher 
wages for women lower growth, but more market 
participation enhances human capacities produc-
tion and growth is elusive or unstable.
The second part of the paper then groups countries 
by economic structure, level of development and 
structure of social welfare provisioning to determine 
where they fall among the four stylized regimes of 
growth and social reproduction. The emphasis is on 
understanding how increasing gender equality in the 
labour market will affect larger processes of growth 
and what kinds of limits the structure of social re-
production places on the potential for development 
and growth. At the heart of this policy analysis is the 
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point that growth, social reproduction and gender 
equality are connected in ways that make care a key 
determinant of macroeconomic policy outcomes, 
growth and development. Social reproduction is 
 
essential for growth, and the social and economic 
circumstances under which it takes place determine 
the precise nature of this relationship as well as 
chart promising pathways for change. 
RÉSUMÉ
Dans ce document, nous élaborons une série de régimes 
qui relient les structures de la croissance économique 
à celles de la reproduction sociale. Nous relions  en-
suite ces régimes à des groupes de pays organisés en 
fonction de leur structure économique et leur niveau 
de développement et évaluons les conséquences 
macroéconomiques d’un recul des inégalités entre les 
sexes sur le marché du travail. La reproduction sociale 
est définie en termes de temps et d’argent nécessaires 
pour produire, maintenir de la main-d’œuvre, et investir 
dans celle-ci. Elle comprend donc les soins  rémunérés 
et non rémunérés. L’analyse met l’accent sur la manière 
dont la répartition de la production et de la reproduc-
tion entre les femmes, les hommes, l’État et le capital 
détermine les investissements et la croissance et sur la 
manière dont les inégalités entre les sexes sont à la fois 
les causes et les conséquences de ces relations. 
Nous commençons par élaborer un modèle mac-
roéconomique conceptuel de croissance et de 
reproduction sociale. Notre approche globale de la 
macroéconomie est définie par les économistes com-
me « structuraliste », dans le sens où la répartition des 
revenus joue un rôle central dans la demande globale, 
les investissements et la croissance, et la structure de 
l’économie est un important facteur qui détermine la 
façon dont ces interactions se font. La reproduction 
sociale est intégrée à ce modèle en considérant le 
travail comme un moyen de production produit. Ce 
sont principalement les femmes (mais aussi les hom-
mes) qui exécutent  ce processus de reproduction en 
effectuant des soins rémunérés et non rémunérés. Un 
objectif essentiel est de faire la différence entre les 
sociétés se soucient le plus de leurs citoyens et celles 
qui s’en soucient le moins. Cette distinction pourrait 
être liée aux normes sociales concernant l’obligation 
intergénérationnelle qui  engendrent des préférences 
altruistes ; à la présence de secteurs assurant une pro-
tection sociale efficace  créent des emplois hautement 
qualifiés et bien payés dans le secteur des soins ; ou 
plus probablement, à l’existence d’idéaux sexospéci-
fiques encouragent les femmes à fournir des soins de 
qualité sans rémunération ou très peu. 
Cela crée une matrice binaire qui relie les mécanismes 
macroéconomiques de croissance aux mécanismes de 
répartition de la reproduction sociale. S’agissant de la 
croissance, nous faisons la différence entre ce que nous 
appelons les économies bienveillantes et celles qui ne le 
sont pas en examinant la relation entre les salaires, les 
investissements dans les êtres humains et la croissance 
économique. Dans les économies bienveillantes, les 
salaires élevés se traduisent par de plus gros investisse-
ments dans les capacités humaines, ce qui accroît les 
possibilités de croissance à long terme. Dans les écono-
mies moins bienveillantes, l’impact des salaires plus 
élevés sur les investissements n’est pas assez important 
pour contrer leur effet négatif sur les profits, ce qui 
nuit à la croissance. La reproduction sociale comprend 
également deux cas schématisés : La mauvaise voie cor-
respond à une féminisation des responsabilités et des 
obligations, tandis que la bonne voie  se caractérise par 
une répartition égale, plus d’égalité entre les sexes des 
coûts de la reproduction sociale en termes de temps et 
d’argent. 
Si l’on regroupe les quatre cas, nous obtenons une 
série de quatre régimes schématisés : la compression 
du temps, la distribution mutuelle, la compression des 
revenus et l’exploitation. Dans le cas de la compression 
du temps, des salaires plus élevés pour les femmes 
favorisent la croissance, mais une participation accrue 
sur le marché du travail compresse le temps et diminue 
la production des capacités humaines, ce qui se traduit 
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par une croissance insaisissable ou instable. Dans le 
cas de la distribution mutuelle, des revenus élevés pour 
les femmes sont favorables à la croissance, une plus 
grande participation sur le marché accroît la production 
des capacités humaines, et la croissance et la reproduc-
tion sociale se renforcent donc mutuellement. Dans le 
cas de l’exploitation, des salaires plus élevés pour les 
femmes nuisent à la croissance, une plus grande par-
ticipation sur le marché compresse le temps et diminue 
la production des capacités humaines, et la croissance 
repose partiellement sur l’exploitation du travail des 
femmes et des ressources humaines. Dans le dernier 
cas, la compression des revenus, des salaires plus élevés 
pour les femmes nuisent à la croissance, mais une plus 
forte participation sur le marché du travail améliore la 
production des capacités humaines et la croissance est 
insaisissable ou instable.
La deuxième partie du document regroupe ensuite les 
pays en fonction de leur structure économique, de leur 
niveau de développement et de la structure de leur 
régime de protection sociale afin de déterminer leur 
appartenance à l’un de quatre régimes schématisés 
de croissance et de reproduction sociale. Il s’agit avant 
tout de comprendre la manière dont le renforcement 
de l’égalité de genre sur le marché du travail affecte 
des processus plus larges relatifs à la croissance et 
quels types  de limites la structure de la reproduction 
sociale place sur le potentiel de développement et 
de croissance. Il y a au cœur de cet analyse politique 
l’argument selon lequel la croissance, la reproduction 
sociale et l’égalité de genre sont liées de telles 
manières que les soins sont un facteur déterminant 
des résultats de la politique macroéconomique, de 
la croissance et du développement. La reproduction 
sociale est essentielle à la croissance, et les circon-
stances sociales et économiques dans lesquelles 
elle se fait déterminent la nature précise de cette 
relation et laissent entrevoir de réelles possibilités 
de  changement. 
RESUMEN
En este artículo, la autora describe un conjunto 
de regímenes que vinculan las estructuras de cre-
cimiento económico con las de reproducción social. 
Asimismo, se establece una relación entre dichos 
regímenes con diversos grupos de países organizados 
según su estructura económica y nivel de desarrollo, 
y se evalúan las consecuencias macroeconómicas 
de la recesión sobre la desigualdad de género en el 
mercado laboral. La reproducción social se define 
en términos del tiempo y los recursos económicos 
necesarios para producir mano de obra, mantenerla 
e invertir en ella; incluye tanto el trabajo remunerado 
como el trabajo de cuidados no remunerado. El análi-
sis se centra en el modo en que las distribuciones de 
producción y reproducción entre mujeres, hombres, 
el Estado y el capital determinan la inversión y el cre-
cimiento, y describe la desigualdad de género como 
causa y consecuencia de dichas relaciones. 
La autora parte de la elaboración de un mod-
elo macroeconómico conceptual de crecimiento y 
reproducción social. El enfoque global que adopta 
con respecto a la macroeconomía es el que las y 
los economistas denominan “estructuralista”, en el 
sentido de que la distribución de los ingresos des-
empeña un papel crucial en la demanda agregada, la 
inversión y el crecimiento, y de que la estructura de la 
economía es un factor determinante en estas inter-
acciones. La reproducción social se incorpora a este 
modelo tratando el factor trabajo como un medio 
de producción que, a su vez, también es producido. 
Este proceso de reproducción corre principalmente a 
cargo de las mujeres (pero también de los hombres) 
a través del trabajo tanto remunerado como no re-
munerado. Uno de los objetivos clave es diferenciar 
las sociedades que prestan más o mejores cuidados 
de aquellas que prestan menos cuidados. El motivo 
de esta diferencia puede residir en la existencia de 
normas sociales sobre las obligaciones intergen-
eracionales, que induzcan preferencias altruistas; 
de sectores de bienestar social sólidos que creen 
puestos de trabajo altamente cualificados y bien 
remunerados en el sector del cuidado; o, con mayor 
probabilidad, de ideales de género que alienten a las 
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mujeres a prestar cuidados de alta calidad a cambio 
de una remuneración escasa o nula. 
El resultado es una matriz de dos filas y dos colum-
nas que vincula los mecanismos macroeconómicos 
de crecimiento con los de la distribución de la re-
producción social. En términos de crecimiento, la 
autora distingue entre lo que denomina economías 
con una alta o baja propensión a la prestación de 
cuidados, identificando para ello la relación entre los 
salarios, la inversión en las personas y el crecimiento 
económico. En las economías con elevada propen-
sión a la prestación de cuidados, los mayores salarios 
están asociados a una inversión más intensa en las 
capacidades humanas, lo que aumenta las posibili-
dades de crecimiento a largo plazo. En las economías 
con baja propensión a la prestación de cuidados, 
el efecto de unos salarios más elevados no es lo 
suficientemente fuerte como para contrarrestar los 
efectos negativos que ejercen sobre los beneficios, 
por lo que el crecimiento se ve perjudicado. Por lo que 
respecta a la reproducción social, también se apre-
cian, de forma esquemática, dos casos diferentes: el 
nivel inferior corresponde a una feminización de la 
responsabilidad y de la obligación, mientras que el 
nivel superior se caracteriza por una distribución del 
tiempo y los costos económicos de la reproducción 
social más equitativa e igualitaria desde el punto de 
vista del género. 
Considerando en simultáneo los cuatro casos de-
scritos, se obtiene un conjunto de cuatro regímenes 
que la autora denomina del siguiente modo: «restric-
ciones de tiempo», «régimen mutuo», «restricciones 
salariales» y «explotación». En el régimen de restric-
ciones de tiempo, los salarios más altos que reciben 
las mujeres inciden positivamente en el crecimiento, 
pero su mayor participación en el mercado laboral 
impone restricciones de tiempo y reduce la pro-
ducción de capacidades humanas. De ello resulta 
un crecimiento inestable. En el régimen mutuo, el 
aumento de los salarios de las mujeres también es 
positivo para el crecimiento y la mayor participación 
en el mercado laboral incrementa la producción de 
capacidades humanas; así, el crecimiento y la repro-
ducción social se refuerzan entre sí. En el régimen 
denominado de «explotación», la elevación de los 
salarios de las mujeres provoca una reducción del 
crecimiento; su mayor participación en el mercado 
laboral restringe el tiempo disponible y disminuye la 
producción de capacidades humanas. El crecimiento 
se basa en parte en la explotación del trabajo y los 
recursos humanos femeninos. Por último, en el ré-
gimen de restricciones salariales, el aumento de los 
salarios de las mujeres ocasiona una reducción del 
crecimiento, pero su mayor participación en el mer-
cado laboral mejora la producción de capacidades 
humanas y se obtiene un crecimiento inestable.
En la segunda parte del artículo se agrupan los países 
según su estructura económica, su nivel de desarrollo 
y su estructura de provisión de bienestar social con 
el fin de examinar en cuál de los cuatro regímenes 
esquemáticos de crecimiento y reproducción social 
pueden clasificarse. El análisis busca conocer el modo 
en que un aumento de la igualdad de género en el 
mercado laboral afectará a los procesos globales de 
crecimiento, y qué tipos de limitaciones impone la 
estructura de reproducción social al potencial de cre-
cimiento y desarrollo. Este análisis de políticas parte 
de la hipótesis de que el crecimiento, la reproducción 
social y la igualdad de género están interconectados 
de una forma que convierte al trabajo de cuidados 
en un factor determinante clave para los resultados 
de las políticas macroeconómicas, del crecimiento y 
del desarrollo. La reproducción social es fundamental 
para el crecimiento, y las circunstancias económicas 
y sociales en las que se produce influyen de un modo 
decisivo en la naturaleza de esta relación, al tiempo 
que trazan prometedoras sendas de cambio. 
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1.  
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we develop a set of regimes that link 
structures of economic growth with those of social 
reproduction, with the latter defined in terms of the 
time and money it takes to produce, maintain and 
invest in the labour force. The analytical emphasis 
is on how the distributions of production and repro-
duction among women, men, the state and capital 
determine investment and growth, and how gender 
inequality is both cause and consequence of these 
relationships. We begin by developing a concep-
tual macroeconomic model of growth and social 
reproduction that gives a stylized set of regimes 
for how the two interrelate. We then link these re-
gimes to groups of countries organized by economic 
structure and level of development, evaluating the 
consequences of a decline in gender inequality in the 
labour market.
It is important to note at the outset that our perspec-
tive is limited by our focus on economic growth. As a 
result, we are constrained by an analytical structure 
that values care and capabilities according to their 
roles in market production rather than, for instance, 
their central importance for well-being or an ethical 
society. But this framework contributes to a larger 
project seeking to integrate gender and care more 
fully into economic theory and policy. Growth analyt-
ics are certainly a key part of that.
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2. 
A MACROECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORK FOR 
SOCIAL REPRODUCTION
We begin by developing a conceptual framework for thinking about economic growth in 
ways that can explicitly accommodate processes of social reproduction and the dynamics of 
gender inequality. Though we stop far short of developing a formal mathematical model, we 
draw heavily from our prior work that does (Braunstein et al. 2011). We will try to avoid wad-
ing into the depths and distractions usually required to get formal models going and distil 
the main points into a stylized taxonomy of social reproduction and growth. But there may 
be some moments – particularly in the initial setup – when details seem to obscure more 
than they reveal. We will keep these to a minimum.
Our overall approach to the macroeconomy is what 
economists term ‘structuralist’ in that the distribu-
tion of income plays a central role in consumption, 
investment and growth, and the structure of the 
economy is an important determinant of how these 
interactions play out. Macroeconomic problems do 
not come from a deficiency of savings, as is the usual 
presumption in standard approaches, but rather a 
deficiency of investment and aggregate demand 
(Elson 2004). Firms operate with excess capacity, and 
changes in the short-run level of output change the 
degree of capacity utilization of the economy. Wages 
are set not by the marginal product of labour, as in 
neoclassical models, but rather via a social bargain-
ing process between capitalists and paid workers. 
One of the issues with structuralist models, a 
problem that applies to almost all macroeconomic 
models for that matter, is they tend to ignore the 
public sector. In our approach the public sector serves 
as a conduit for social investment, reflecting public 
preferences regarding the type and extent of public 
resources allocated to social reproduction. One could 
also posit a role for government in mediating the 
rules and norms that structure relations between 
labour and capital (not always benevolently), with 
consequences for revenue and spending. This role is 
not, however, explicitly incorporated here.
Because of the central role accorded to inequality, 
structuralist models do offer promising ground for 
considering gender. However, only a handful of struc-
turalist models explicitly incorporate gender, and 
among those that do, the focus is most often on the 
macroeconomics dynamics of gender-based wage 
inequality and female labour force participation in 
a development context.1 By contrast, we incorporate 
unpaid work and care, and the implications of their 
gendered distribution, into a conceptual model of 
social reproduction that can accommodate a variety 
of economic structures and social welfare regimes. 
1 See, for instance, Ertürk and Çağatay (1995); Braunstein 
(2000); Fontana (2007); Blecker and Seguino (2002); 
Seguino (2010); Akram-Lodhi and Hanmer (2008).
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Before presenting the model, we introduce how we 
portray the economic dimensions of care and social 
reproduction. We define care in both labour-process and 
output terms. In terms of labour process, care is a work 
activity that involves close personal or emotional inter-
action with those being cared for (Folbre 2006). In terms 
of output, care refers to services that are inputs into the 
production and maintenance of the labour force. Some 
forms of care are more direct than others, such as bathing 
a child versus fetching fuel wood for cooking. To some ex-
tent, all work could be categorized as indirect care in that 
its ultimate purpose is to enhance or support human life 
(ibid.). For the purposes of this discussion, however, care 
refers to either direct care services or indirect services 
that support care. Such a perspective emphasizes how 
essential indirect care services are for providing direct 
care, a particularly significant point for developing coun-
tries, where infrastructure and public services can be so 
limited (Razavi 2007). This conceptualization is similar 
to the notion of reproduction used by Marxist feminists, 
where the labour force is reproduced both in the long 
run in terms of preparing the next generation to enter 
the labour force as well as in the short run as the daily 
care given to paid workers to enable them to resume 
their paid work (Folbre 1994; Picchio 1991). 
As an output and an input, labour has two facets: 
quantity (time) and quality (the productivity of that 
time), though we refer to both by using the term 
‘human capacities’. To some extent, quantity and 
quality can be traded off with one another (Becker 
and Lewis 1973), but declines in fertility can be so 
large that increased quality cannot compensate. 
We draw capacities in the widest sense of the term 
and include a broad array of features that make hu-
man beings more economically effective, such as 
emotional maturity and self-confidence, as well as 
standard human capital measures, such as education 
and skills. As such, human capacities are a broader 
category than human capital, but like human capital 
they are defined in terms of how they serve economic 
growth. By contrast, the notion of human capabilities, 
as pioneered by Amartya Sen and used by the United 
Nations and others (including economists), more 
directly reflect well-being. Capabilities are norma-
tive standards and aspirations; capacities are strictly 
instrumental to growth. There is, of course, overlap 
between the two concepts but we use the term hu-
man capacities to emphasize our exclusive focus 
on growth.
Human capacities are produced in the household 
sector using unpaid labour time and commodities.2 In 
the short run, changes in human capacities produc-
tion impact labour productivity rather than labour 
hours. An individual’s paid work time should depend 
on the extent of market demand for labour – either 
one can find a job or not. Productivity once at work, 
however, depends on the extent to which one is being 
supported and replenished at home, the day-to-day 
aspects of reproduction. In the long term, spending 
time or money on the production of labour, whether 
it results in higher fertility or labour productivity, is 
treated as investment rather than daily maintenance. 
Investments in human capacities – such as having an-
other child, sending a child to school or volunteering 
at a community centre in ways that enhance social 
capital – raise future productive capacity (i.e., generate 
economic growth) in ways similar to building more 
plants and equipment, though investing in the future 
labour force is almost never treated as investment in 
macroeconomic models. As with conventional treat-
ments of investment, investment in human capacities 
generates current aggregate demand as well as con-
tributes to long-term economic prospects.
Gender norms around care are also important to dis-
cuss at the outset. Unpaid work and care have been 
understood by feminist economists as highly gendered 
activities with gendered meanings, asymmetrically 
distributed between women and men in both the 
paid and unpaid sectors (Badgett and Folbre 1999; 
Nelson and England 2002). Thus, economic analyses of 
unpaid work and care must be gender aware, as these 
activities impact the economic lives of women and 
men differently. For instance, women’s disproportion-
ate share of unpaid work relative to men constitutes 
a stronger constraint on their participation in and 
gains from the market and the state. Women’s lower 
incomes and relative lack of power over public finance 
decisions contribute to this inequality. At the same 
2 In-kind care services are treated as commodities to the 
extent that their provision is mediated by the market (e.g., 
government workers providing free services to the public).
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time, the gendered care components of paid work help 
to explain differences in male and female employ-
ment and wages, as described so well by Richard Anker 
(1998). We capture these divisions in the model by pos-
iting gender-segregated labour markets and women’s 
association with paid care work. Both women and men 
contribute to the financial and time costs of providing 
care, however, just to varying degrees.
At its core, then, the model is about treating labour 
as a produced means of production. Primarily women 
(but also men) carry out this reproduction process 
by doing both paid and unpaid work. A key goal is to 
differentiate between societies that care more and/or 
better than societies that care less. The reason could 
be social norms around intergenerational obligation 
that induce altruistic preferences; strong social wel-
fare sectors that create highly skilled and well-paid 
jobs in the care sector; or, more likely, gendered ideals 
that encourage women to provide high-quality care 
for little or no pay. To set up this framework, we begin 
with the demand side.
2.1 
The demand side
The demand side of the economy is driven by invest-
ment demand that, in the short run, raises demand for 
current output and, in the long run, raises economic 
growth by increasing productive capacity. In our mod-
el, investment is of two types: what we term physical 
investment undertaken by capitalists and human 
capacities investment undertaken by individuals and 
households.3 Funds for both types of investment are 
drawn from national income, which is split between 
capitalists (profit share) and workers (wage share). 
Because industries and occupations tend to be highly 
segregated by sex, we further disaggregate the wage 
share into the female and male wage shares. 
Whether capitalists decide to invest depends partly 
on their expectations about the profitability of those 
investments – the rate of profit, defined as total prof-
its as a proportion of the capital stock.4 Here is where 
things get a bit tricky but in an analytically important 
3 Physical investment includes investment in fixed capital as 
well as that which results in technological change – one 
might think of technological change as endogenous to the 
processes of physical investment. In this paper we focus on 
demand-side constraints in social reproduction terms, but 
it is important to emphasize that growth also comes from 
capitalist investment (the standard source of growth in 
growth models).
4 The relationship between expected profit rates and actual 
investment is conditioned by what Keynes termed “animal 
spirits”, a sort of “spontaneous urge to action” that is built 
on widely acknowledged but poorly understood waves of 
market confidence and panic. For more on this point, see 
Braunstein et al. (2011).
way: the profit rate can increase even when the profit 
share declines because of how changes in output af-
fect profit rates. If the wage share increases (meaning 
that the profit share declines), workers with more 
money to spend will increase aggregate demand 
and consequent output. If the positive effect of the 
increase in output (and total profits) outweighs the 
negative effect of the decline in profit share, increased 
wage shares can be associated with higher profit 
rates, more capitalist investment demand and higher 
growth. These types of economies, where increases in 
the wage share are associated with higher output and 
growth, are termed ‘wage-led’. Their converse, where 
increases in the wage share are associated with lower 
output and growth are termed ‘profit-led’, indicating 
how a redistribution of income away from workers to 
capitalists will raise economic growth.5
5 Strictly speaking, to get to this point we need to say some-
thing about savings. On the demand side, macroeconomic 
equilibrium means that the investment desired by investors 
equals that supplied by savers (both domestic and foreign). 
Because investment is both the binding constraint and the 
mechanism for social reproduction on the demand side in our 
framework, we do not give further details on savings dynam-
ics. But there might be some interesting gender dynamics 
to consider at some point in the future. Erturk and Cagatay 
(1995) propose that increases in the intensity of women’s 
unpaid work in the household raises savings rates. Seguino 
and Floro (2003) find that, for a group of semi-industrialized 
countries, higher incomes and more bargaining power for 
women are associated with higher aggregate savings rates.
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Setting that point aside for the moment, we turn to 
investment in human capacities. Rather than centre 
their decisions on expected profit rates, individuals in-
vest in themselves and others based on expectations 
about future economic opportunities. Higher wage 
shares boost those expectations, as does more current 
economic activity as measured by output. The path-
way from expectations about future opportunities to 
actual investments in human capacities is governed by 
what we term ‘caring spirits’: the tendency – whether 
determined by social norms, individual motivation or 
public preferences as reflected in the structure of the 
social welfare state – to provide care (or support for 
care) for oneself and others in ways that add to current 
aggregate demand and future economic productivity.
We differentiate between two types of caring spirit 
regimes: those with ‘strong’ caring spirits versus those 
with ‘weak’ ones; we also alternatively refer to the 
strong/weak dichotomy as altruistic/individualistic to 
emphasize the difference between other-directed and 
self-oriented preferences. The extent of public involve-
ment in expressing these preferences, and the social 
and political processes that guide it, are significant 
issues. Feminists have emphasized how state support 
for care, and whether need or provision of it is treated 
as a social right, are important correlates of gender 
inequality (Daly 2011). In an analysis of care policies in 
Western Europe, Daly (2001) differentiates between 
‘caring’ and ‘non-caring’ States, with the former treat-
ing high-quality care as a part of social citizenship and 
the latter exercising few policy interventions around 
care, leaving it to families and markets. Though we do 
not deal with how care is delivered – public or private, 
family or market, women or men – on the demand 
side, we do so in the next section on the supply side. 
Still, it is likely that the institutional structure of care 
delivery is a determinant of the relationship between 
human capacities investment and growth, with pub-
lic investment in care more closely associated with 
strong caring spirit regimes.
Getting back to the dynamics of human capacities 
investment, we argue that, all else being equal, 
changes in expected opportunities will have a bigger 
impact on investment in human capacities in altru-
istic societies than in individualistic ones. The reason 
is that, relative to individualistic societies, societies 
with strong caring spirits tend to spend more of 
their care finances and time in ways that enhance 
the ability of household or community members to 
take advantage of future economic opportunities 
through, for instance, education or job training for 
the disabled. When wages or output decline and 
expected opportunities worsen, these sorts of invest-
ments decline as well, especially in altruistic societies 
where care resources get reallocated from long-term 
investment to countering the short-term effects of 
economic decline and wage squeeze by, for example, 
attending to the emotional stress of unemploy-
ment or compensating for declines in public health 
expenditures or other public goods. This sort of 
public disinvestment in human capital and the con-
sequent pressure on the unpaid care sector has been 
a frequent criticism of structural adjustment (Elson 
1995). The same dynamics are at work when fertility 
rates decline during economic recessions (Sobotka 
et al. 2011). The net result is that the responsiveness 
of investment in human capacities with respect to 
changes in expected opportunities is higher in altruis-
tic societies than in individualistic ones.  
Cast in the context of growth, the stronger the caring 
spirits, the more likely that economic growth is wage-
led. The reason is that higher wages increase not only 
consumer demand but also demand for investment 
in human capacities. In fact, even if the increase in 
consumer demand is not enough to completely offset 
the negative impact on the profit rate of a decline in 
the profit share, higher wages could spur such a large 
increase in human capacities investment that total 
investment (capitalist investment plus human capaci-
ties) could still be positive.
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BOX 2-1 
Measuring caring spirits
Given this complex theoretical story, it is useful to 
pause and consider how we might actually measure 
caring spirits using available data. Here we provide 
an example of one possibility – the non-income 
human development index (HDI), which includes 
measures of achievements in health and education.6 
We contend that countries with strong caring spirits, 
where investments in well-being are a central cause 
and consequence of economic activities, would also 
be top performers in terms of positive changes in 
their non-income HDIs. An alternative (and probably 
better) proxy might be child and elderly poverty rates 
in combination with some measure of economic 
mobility. These more directly reflect how the social 
structures of reproduction manifest in public and 
private preferences and capabilities. But we use the 
non-income HDI because it proffers a consistent 
time series for a large number of countries.
The methodology we use for measuring caring spirits 
is straightforward. Countries are categorized into one 
of three groups according to their 2010 per capita 
income: low and low middle income, middle income, 
and high income.7 We split the sample this way be-
cause higher-income countries tend to have higher 
human development, all else equal. We then add a 
trendline for the group that predicts the change in 
a country’s non-income HDI given its level in 1990 
and the performances of the other countries in its in-
come group between 1990 and 2010. Figures 2-1A,  B 
and C illustrate the results. Countries that are above 
the line had a larger than predicted increase in their 
non-income HDIs over the period while countries be-
low the line had a smaller than predicted increase. As 
for what constitutes having ‘strong’ caring spirits, we 
simply list those for which the increase in the non-
income HDI is greater than one half of one standard 
deviation above its predicted value. Those with ‘weak’ 
caring spirits demonstrate the opposite – the change 
6 Achievements in education are measured by mean years of school-
ing for adults older than 25 and expected years of schooling for 
children entering school; achievements in health are measured by 
life expectancy at birth (UNDP 2013). 
7 Low and low middle-income countries are grouped together to 
give a sample large enough to conduct the analysis.
in non-income HDI is greater than one half of one 
standard deviation below its predicted value.
This is, of course, a completely relativist exercise 
in that, by construction, the deviations above the 
trendline counterbalance the deviations below. But 
it is instructive in that it shows how a wide variety 
of institutional arrangements and rates of economic 
growth can be consistent with different levels of 
investment in human capacities as measured by 
achievements in health and education. 
Figure 2-1A shows that a number of Central American 
countries demonstrate strong caring spirits, starting 
and ending the period with relatively high levels of 
non-income HDI despite a diversity of income levels. 
Conversely, Rwanda and Yemen made the strong car-
ing spirits list largely because they began the period 
with such low levels of human development (though 
the trendline does control for initial levels, one imag-
ines it is fairly ‘cheap’ to boost human development on 
this side of the distribution). A number of the countries 
in the weak caring spirits list have been plagued by on-
going political turmoil and war, making investments in 
human capacities difficult to conduct. 
In Figure 2-1B of high middle-income countries, three 
Latin American countries make it to the high caring 
spirits list, with another five above the trendline. If we 
drop Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (all of which 
have high mortality as a result of AIDS-related deaths) 
from the sample – since the poor human development 
performance in these three countries is exerting a lot 
of influence over the placement of the trendline – the 
trendline gets steeper and the overall fit is much bet-
ter.8 Argentina makes it to the strong caring spirits list 
and Turkey and Venezuela drop off (though they are 
still above the trendline). Mauritius and Thailand are 
added to the weak caring spirits list. Though country 
placement above and below the trendline does not 
change very much as a result of this exercise, it does 
indicate that defining reference groups and thresh-
olds are processes that require careful thinking.
8  The R-squared increases to 0.39.
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In Figure 2-1C, the strong caring spirits list is domi-
nated by European countries, followed by East Asian 
newly industrialized countries that have made signifi-
cant investments in health and education (Republic 
of Korea and Singapore). On the weak caring spirits 
side, we have the more liberal economies of Australia, 
Canada and the United States, the Middle Eastern 
oil-exporters Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, as well as 
Cyprus, the Russian Federation and Uruguay. That 
Italy and Spain, with largely familial models of wel-
fare provision, make it to the strong caring spirits list, 
while the model social welfare states of Denmark and 
Finland do not even place them above the trendline, 
is surprising but instructive. All we measure here is 
relative achievements in health and education as re-
flected in the non-income HDI. Institutional features 
of social welfare delivery, such as the extent of gender 
inequality in the provision of care, are captured on the 
supply side of the model. All we can say, based on this 
analysis, is that relative achievements over the past 
two decades in these aspects of human development 
have been greater in Italy and Spain than in Denmark 
and Finland. As of 2010, these four countries had 
similar non-income HDIs: Denmark 0.921, Finland 0.91, 
Italy 0.91 and Spain 0.915. Italy and Spain covered more 
ground over the prior 20 years, with much greater pos-
itive changes, to simply reach the high levels already 
established in Denmark and Finland.
Low	and	low	middle-income	countries
Source and notes: Author’s calculations based on non-income HDI data from UNDP. Countries are categorized as having strong 
caring spirits if their non-income HDI increase is greater than one half of one standard deviation above its predicted value and weak 
caring spirits if their non-income HDI change is greater than one half of one standard deviation below its predicted value.
Strong	caring	spirits: Bangladesh; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; Indonesia; Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Morocco; 
Nicaragua; Paraguay; Plurinational State of Bolivia ; Rwanda; Viet Nam; Yemen 
Weak	caring	spirits:	Cameroon; Central African Republic; Congo; Democratic Republic of Congo; Côte d’Ivoire; Kenya; Kyrgyzstan; 
Lesotho; Mozambique; Niger; Republic of Moldova; Sudan; Swaziland; Tajikistan; Zambia
FIGURE 2-1A 
Human	development	and	caring	spirits,	1990–2010
Economic Growth and 
Social Reproduction 8
FIGURE 2-1B 
High	middle-income	countries
Source and notes: See Figure 2-1A.
Strong	caring	spirits:	Algeria; Belize; Brazil; Hungary; Malaysia; Mexico; Tunisia; Turkey; Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Weak	caring	spirits:	Belize; Botswana; Gabon; Namibia; South Africa; Tonga
FIGURE 2-1C 
High-income	countries
Source and notes: See Figure 2-1A.
Strong	caring	spirits:	France; Germany; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Norway; Republic of Korea; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Spain 
Weak	caring	spirits:	Australia; Bahrain; Canada; Cyprus; Kuwait; Qatar; Russian Federation; United States; Uruguay
Economic Growth and 
Social Reproduction 9
TABLE 2-1 
Demand	and	growth
Wage-led/Altruistic Profit-led/Individualistic
Explanation
Higher wage share is expansionary: The positive impact 
of increased consumer demand, combined with increased 
investments in human capacities, outweigh the contraction-
ary impact of the decline in the profit share. 
Higher profit share is expansionary: The positive impact of 
increased capitalist investment demand outweighs the nega-
tive impact of lower wages on consumer demand and human 
capacities investment. 
Factors	that	make	this	scenario	more	likely
Strong caring spirits Weak caring spirits
Domestically oriented economy Globally oriented economy
Developmental macro policy Neoliberal macro policy
In addition to caring spirits, the wage- versus profit-led 
dichotomy also partly depends on the extent and type 
of globalization. The typical pathway in these sorts of 
models is through net exports: higher wages are asso-
ciated with a loss of international competitiveness and 
an increase in the relative affordability of imports. Thus, 
the more globally integrated the economy, the more 
likely these leakages will dominate and growth will be 
profit-led. Since women and men may be segregated 
into differentially globally-exposed sectors, economies 
may be profit-led in terms of female wages and wage-
led in terms of male wages, though the incorporation 
of investment in human capacities decreases the size 
of this wedge.9 Outside of net exports, other aspects of 
global integration and policy also raise the likelihood 
that growth is profit-led. Higher capital mobility means 
that capital is more likely to leave than make produc-
tivity-enhancing investments when faced with higher 
wages. A shortage of foreign exchange, of the type that 
is occasioned by weak export performance or substan-
tial capital outflows, makes it more difficult to service 
foreign debt and purchase international technologies 
and capital goods. The increased economic volatility 
that often comes with globalization and financializa-
tion render all types of investment – human and not 
– more expensive and risky. 
9 This difference in the relationship between female and male 
wages and growth in the context of globalization builds 
on the insights of Seguino (2000), who made the observa-
tion in the context of semi-industrialized economies that 
specialize in labour-intensive exports. It is not a general 
conclusion on the impact of gender-based wage inequality 
and growth but one that is grounded in economic struc-
ture, the nature of exports and gendered labour market 
segregation. For a recent empirical debate on these issues, 
see Schober and Winter-Ebmer (2011) and Seguino (2011). 
Neoliberal macroeconomic policies, high interest 
rates, appreciated real exchange rates and restricted 
government spending associated with inflation-tar-
geting and macroeconomic management in many 
economies (partly as a response to the current era 
of globalization) tend to magnify all of these effects, 
as well as discourage public investments in human 
capacities. In sum, the more significant the global 
economy is relative to the domestic economy, the 
more volatile its effects, and the more neoliberal the 
policy menu used to manage those relationships, the 
more likely that the growth regime is profit-led.
Table 2-1 summarizes these contrasting demand 
regimes. We have discussed all of its components 
with the exception of developmental macro policy, 
the converse of the neoliberal version. We use the 
term ‘developmental macro policy’ to refer to poli-
cies designed to do more than just maintain price 
stability. Maintaining competitive real exchange rates, 
using monetary and fiscal policies to generate high-
quality employment, and the judicious use of capital 
controls are all examples of macroeconomic policies that 
directly promote development and growth with equity. 
They also increase the likelihood that higher wages are 
consonant with more growth. Though beyond the scope 
of the present paper, many extensive and thoughtful 
discussions of these issues abound.10 Looking back at 
Table 2-1, in the discussion that follows, we emphasize 
the difference between altruistic and individualistic 
regimes. But the differences in global orientation and 
macroeconomic policy will feature prominently as well. 
10 A good compendium can be found in Ocampo and Jomo 
(2007) and Epstein and Yeldan (2009). For a gender-aware 
view, see Seguino and Grown (2006) and Elson (2007).
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2.2 
The supply side
The supply side of the model is constituted by interac-
tion among three different spheres: the labour market, 
the product market and the production of human 
capacities in the household sector. For the purposes of 
the conceptual framework, we focus on the household 
sector, where the maintenance and production of hu-
man capacities takes place. We begin, however, with a 
summary sketch of labour and product markets.
Labour and product markets are characterized by a di-
vision of labour between women and men. In general, 
we link female labour supply with the provision of 
direct and indirect care services in the market, but the 
significance of this sector as a source of employment 
for women and a determinant of human capacities 
production will ultimately vary based on economic 
structure. The parallel pattern of men’s employment 
will also, of course, vary by economic structure, but 
our focus on social reproduction and the space limits 
of this paper necessitate that most of the economic 
forces we discuss are driven by changes in the struc-
ture and status of women’s employment. 
Wages are determined via a process of bargaining 
that occurs between paid workers and their capitalist 
employers, a process that results in labour’s bargain-
ing power (and wages) rising along with output. This 
relationship is a stylized one. It does not mean that 
everyone works in a capitalist firm but simply that 
as capacity utilization increases and unemployment 
declines, worker incomes tend to increase. Of course, 
the ability of workers to successfully translate tighter 
labour markets into higher wages is closely linked 
with a variety of labour market institutions as well 
as gender. Women’s collective bargaining power vis-
à-vis capital is presumably lower than men’s, a point 
consistent with the prevalence and persistence of 
the gender wage gap across all sorts of economies. 
Low wages are a particularly vexing issue in paid care 
sectors, where workers are not only predominantly 
female but are also paid less than other types of 
workers with similar skill levels (Budig and Misra 2010; 
England et al. 2002). From a development perspective, 
if women are concentrated in the types of paid work 
where the prospect of bargaining for higher wages 
does not really exist – such as doing piece rate work 
at home, marketing the family’s agricultural goods or 
being a paid domestic worker – higher growth may 
induce little change in women’s individual earnings.
Getting back to the conceptual framework, the wages 
that emerge from conditions in the labour market, 
combined with labour productivity as determined 
by the state of human capacities, specify the costs of 
production. Capitalists then determine profit share 
by marking up prices over these costs, a decision 
constrained by demand conditions. We can begin to 
see some of the contradictory forces at work in the 
system: higher wages for women are desirable from 
the perspective of gender inequality, but they may 
also raise the price of care and put pressure on repro-
duction. At the same time, buoyant demand for paid 
care from either the private or public sectors is key to 
supporting higher wages for care workers.
Turning now to the production of human capacities in 
the household sector, we can think of this process in 
terms of a social reproduction function situated in the 
household to which communities, markets and the 
state may contribute. This placement is not intended 
as limiting social reproduction to a particular physical 
location but rather as establishing a perspective from 
which to draw a variety of factors together. In this 
sense, the household is an entry point into the system 
as well as a key location for social reproduction, one 
corner of Razavi’s (2007) “care diamond” from which we 
can explore others. Figure 2-2 serves as a visual guide 
for the discussion. Inputs into the social reproduction 
function are of three types: time, commodities and 
infrastructure.11 They are combined to produce human 
capacities, which in the short term refer to the daily 
maintenance of the labour force and in the longer term 
to investments in both quality and quantity.
11 Commodities are defined as goods and services that pass 
through the market. Even where the household receives in-kind 
services that it does not directly pay for, these services are paid 
for by others (e.g., governments or non-governmental organiza-
tions) and hence are treated as commodities in the model.
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COMMODITIES
Modes of delivery
Public
 
Private
On the input side of the social reproduction func-
tion, we begin with non-market time. Women, men, 
children and networks of kin or community may all 
be important contributors of unremunerated time 
into social reproduction. We also know, however, 
that women perform the bulk of unpaid household 
work whether or not they also participate in paid 
work (Budlender 2008; Charmes 2006; Folbre 2006). 
Because we concentrate on gender inequality, the di-
vision of labour between women and men as well as, 
eventually, women and the state, centres the analy-
sis.12 Labour supply is the result of intrahousehold 
negotiations: women and men bargain over the time 
each will spend on reproductive labour by weighing 
its opportunity cost, namely the wage each could 
12 There are also other forms of inequality that influence the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of care such as class, 
nationality, race, ethnicity or age. 
earn in market activities, along with social norms, 
individual objectives and the family’s provision- 
ing needs. 
That women’s wages are systematically lower than 
men’s means, all else equal, that women will con-
tribute more unpaid time to household work. But 
independent of the wages on offer, social norms 
might discourage women’s market work or condi-
tion them to be strongly time altruistic, lowering 
the responsiveness of female market labour sup-
ply to wages. Legal rules that ensure long parental 
leaves from employment have been associated with 
lower female wages because of the frequent career 
interruptions among mothers that use them and per-
sistent identification of women with caring labour 
FIGURE 2-2 
The	social	reproduction	function
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(Gupta et al. 2008).13 Regardless of the differences 
in their responses to wages, if women or men spend 
less time at home, human capacities production may 
suffer. Just how much depends on the structure and 
productivity of that unpaid labour time, involving 
factors like skill, motivation, the availability of care-
related commodities and, of course, the state of one’s 
own human capacities (tired caregivers are usually 
less effective ones).
The second set of inputs, commodities, are financed 
by income from work or public and private trans-
fers. They include direct and indirect care services 
and capital goods such as stoves, refrigerators and 
washing machines. Financing the monetary costs 
of social reproduction is a gender issue touching 
on two key questions: what proportion of incomes 
is devoted to reproduction (from women and men 
directly or indirectly via taxes or charitable contribu-
tions that support reproduction); and what these 
contributions actually purchase. Like decisions about 
time, these financial decisions are the result of intra-
household bargaining, though they also reflect social 
bargaining over the size and structure of the social 
welfare system. Therefore, the impact of income on 
human capacities depends not only on how much 
is earned and spent but also on what is purchased 
and whether these commodities provide good sub-
stitutes or complements for unpaid care time. Think 
of professionalized and well-paid versus informal and 
underpaid care sector workers, purchasing a refrig-
erator versus a television set, or devoting public funds 
to the provision of childcare services versus expand-
ing national defence. All of these arguably contribute 
to social reproduction, just to varying degrees and in 
ways that reflect gender. 
Modes of delivery of care commodities determine 
these issues as well. Whether goods and services are 
provided through primarily public or private channels, 
by government, community or for-profit institutions 
relates to both their quality and price as well as af-
fecting the gender division of reproductive labour. 
13 This is not to argue that parental leaves are bad public policy, 
just that it is women who tend to take them, and when the 
leaves are long women experience systematic labour conse-
quences that are correlated with their gender.
Higher market participation among Nordic mothers 
compared to other Western countries is associated 
with high quality publicly provided preschool (Gupta 
et al. 2008; OECD 2012b). In countries such as France 
and Germany, providing cash subsidies directly to 
families to help defuse the cost of care commodi-
ties resulted in the growth of a low-skilled and 
low-wage care sector (Razavi and Staab 2010). When 
public care services rely on volunteers, as they do in a 
number of low and middle-income countries, pay is 
low, quality questionable and few women increase 
their work participation as a result (ibid.). Modes of 
delivery are thus not merely a technical detail; they 
also fundamentally shape the gender content and 
consequences of the marketization of care.
The last input, public infrastructure, refers to goods 
such as roads, electricity, sanitation and water that 
decrease the opportunity cost of market work, mostly 
by lowering the time intensity of care work by wom-
en but also by lowering the price and increasing the 
availability of care commodities (Agénor and Agénor 
2009). It is an often-neglected aspect of the relation-
ships between social reproduction, gender inequality 
and growth but a key determinant and outcome of 
the gender system.
Taken together, the production of human capacities 
in the household sector, combined with the deter-
mination of wages, prices and profit shares in the 
labour and product markets, constitute the supply 
side of our conceptual model. There are many analyti-
cal avenues one can venture down using this set of 
relationships, but for the task set in this paper we 
stylize two different supply regimes that reflect the 
gender distribution of social reproduction: low road 
versus high road. The key difference between the two 
is that in the low road regime, higher female labour 
force participation is associated with a decline in 
human capacities production, while in the high road 
regime, increased female labour force participation 
also increases human capacities production.
In the low road regime, the negative association 
between human capacities production and female 
labour force participation is driven by low wages and 
poor working conditions for women in general and 
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care sector workers in particular, set against a back-
drop of little public support for social reproduction.14 
Low wages for women mean, on the one hand, that 
they can ill afford to purchase care commodities to 
compensate for the decline in the nonmarket work 
time that market participation induces (we will 
discuss male contributions in a moment). It also sug-
gests that the care commodities they do purchase are 
likely to be inferior substitutes for unpaid time, as the 
quality of these commodities reflects the poor labour 
market conditions in which they are produced. Low 
wages for care workers have been linked with higher 
rates of turnover, deskilling and increasing overall 
work burdens for women, all of which lower their ef-
fectiveness at providing care (Appelbaum and Leana 
2011; Razavi and Staab 2010).15 Weak demand for care 
services, both from workers who can ill afford them 
and paltry public provision, keep their prices – and the 
wages of these workers – low. 
Other factors that increase the likelihood of the low 
road scenario include significant out-migration of 
adult household members who will no longer be able 
to contribute any time to social reproduction (though 
they may make up for some of that through financial 
contributions) and poor infrastructure for reproduc-
tive work. The net result from an aggregate supply 
perspective is that expanding market production and 
increasing women’s labour force participation threat-
en profits because the potentially higher profit share 
spurred by more economic activity is outweighed 
by the decline in human capacities production. This 
decline manifests in the short run as lower labour 
productivity but in the longer term as decreased 
investment in human capacities, including possibly 
fertility decline, an issue that plagues a number of 
14 Indeed, low wages for care workers and weak public provi-
sion are empirically correlated with one another across a 
variety of countries (Budig and Misra 2010).
15 Razavi and Staab (2010) is an introductory overview of a 
special issue of the International Labour Review, a collection 
of articles on a wide variety of countries and the working 
conditions of their care workers.
advanced industrialized economies with weak public 
supports for child-rearing.16 
Conversely, the high road regime is characterized by 
the opposite: higher female labour force participa-
tion is associated with increases in human capacities 
production. Strong care sectors, occasioned by good 
wages for care workers and lots of public and private 
demand for care services, underlie a sort of virtuous 
cycle. Commodities serve as effective substitutes 
and complements for declines in women’s unpaid 
labour time with marketization, perhaps also mak-
ing it possible for women to reorganize their unpaid 
labour time in ways that actually raise its efficiency. 
Less time taken up by indirect care services frees up 
time for work and direct care, potentially increasing 
human capacities production and investment. Good 
infrastructure for reproductive work reinforces these 
positive relationships. While it is true that the higher 
wages and taxes that pay for the high road do press 
on the profit share, the higher prices supported by 
strong demand and increases in labour productivity 
more than compensate. Thus, in the high road supply 
regime, higher output and female labour force partici-
pation are associated with a higher profit share.
So far we have focused on female labour force par-
ticipation and the fortunes of (primarily female) care 
sector workers. But both women and men contrib-
ute time and money to social reproduction, either 
directly or indirectly through taxes and charitable 
contributions. How they split these responsibilities 
is correlated with whether the high or low road re-
gime prevails. The more that women and men share 
the time and financial costs of care, the more likely 
that increases in female labour force participation 
and output will increase the production of human 
capacities by more than it will cut into profits and 
16 The question of the relationship between female labour force 
participation and fertility is a tricky one because of their mutu-
al causality. The typical story is that higher female labour force 
participation is associated with lower fertility, but this result 
partly depends on the extent of public supports for the repro-
ductive work of women involved in paid work. For instance, 
the high fertility and low female employment in Ireland or the 
high fertility and high female employment in Scandinavian 
countries can be linked to differences in the structures of their 
social welfare systems (Esping-Anderson 1996).
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TABLE 2-2 
Supply	and	distribution	of	social	reproduction
Low	road: High	road:
Feminization	of	responsibility	and	obligation	(FRO) Gender	egalitarian	(GE)
Explanation
Increasing output and female labour force participation is 
associated with declines in human capacities production, 
ultimately lowering profits.
Increasing output and female labour force participation is 
associated with increases in human capacities production and 
higher profits.
Factors	that	make	this	scenario	more	likely
Low male contributions to social reproduction Significant contributions to social reproduction by both 
women and men
Large gender wage gaps Small gender wage gaps
Limited and/or low quality market care sector Extensive and high quality market care sector
Little public provision of care Strong public provision of care
Poor reproductive infrastructure Good reproductive infrastructure
the more likely the high road case will be. The simple 
reason is that the time and financial burdens of social 
reproduction are spread among more contributors, so 
increasing female labour force participation can be 
counterbalanced by supports in the family, commu-
nity and state. The more complex reason involves how 
wages and prices change in ways that support more 
human capacities production when both women and 
men devote resources – both private and public – to 
it. We call this the gender egalitarian (GE) case. Note 
that gender egalitarianism is also reflected by a num-
ber of factors associated with the high road: smaller 
gender wage gaps (to the extent they stem from good 
wages for women as opposed to low wages for men), 
an extensive and high quality market care sector, lots 
of public provision of care services, and good repro-
ductive infrastructure. 
By contrast, in cases where men contribute very 
little to social reproduction in terms of either time 
or financing (directly or via payments to the state 
or other organizations), the more likely the low road 
case prevails and women’s market participation is 
associated with decreases in social reproduction 
and profit share. We call this the feminization of 
responsibility and obligation (FRO) case, borrowing a 
term developed by Sylvia Chant (2006) to replace the 
concept of feminization of poverty. Her intent was 
to emphasize women’s increasing responsibility for 
maintaining their families’ well-being, and women’s 
lack of choice in doing so, an apt reflection of the 
increasing share of reproductive and economic re-
sponsibilities borne by women in the low road case. 
Parallel to the high road regime, the contributing 
factors of the low road regime are associated with 
the type of gender system that leads to a feminiza-
tion of responsibility and obligation: low wages for 
women as reflected in a large gender wage gap, little 
support from men or the state in carrying out social 
reproduction, and limited markets for care com-
modities that, when they do exist, are characterized 
by low pay and poor quality output. Table 2-2 sum-
marizes the main features of the low and high road 
supply regimes.
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BOX 2-2 
The low road social reproduction strategy of the United States
The United States demonstrates many features of the 
low road and feminization of responsibility and obliga-
tion summarized in Table 2. In this discussion we focus 
on caring for children, but many of our points can be 
extended to caring for the elderly, sick and disabled. 
Women’s	 responsibility	 for	 social	 reproduction.	 Wo-
men bear most of the responsibility for the time costs of 
children and an increasing share of the monetary costs, 
as reflected in rising rates of single motherhood and the 
lack of public support for childrearing. The United States 
has a relatively high female labour force participation 
rate among mothers. About two thirds of women with 
preschool-aged children and three quarters of those 
with school-aged children work for pay. In households 
with two parents, mothers spend about twice as much 
time caring for children as fathers, whether they work 
for pay or not (Parker and Wang 2013). Though most 
children live with both parents, an increasing proportion 
live with lone mothers. In 2012, 24.4 per cent of children 
younger than 18 lived in lone mother households, up 
from 11 per cent in 1970.  
Gender	 inequality	 in	 the	 labour	market.	The gender 
gap in median earnings of full-time employees, at 18.8 
per cent in 2010, is among the highest in the advanced 
industrialized economies. The median for the 28-coun-
try Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) is 14.3 per cent ; the United States 
ranks 7th from the bottom. One of the results is that 
poverty rates for single female-headed households are 
extremely high, reaching 34 per cent in 2011. In terms 
of the dynamics of the low road, gender inequality in 
the labour market means that when women do work 
for pay, whether they parent with partners or alone, 
it is financially challenging to replace their unpaid 
care work with high quality substitutes. It also means 
that becoming a mother, especially a lone mother, 
increases the risk of poverty as the financial and time 
demands of the household increase simultaneously. 
The	 poor	 state	 of	 the	 childcare	 system. In a recent 
New Republic article entitled “The Hell of American 
Day Care”, journalist Jonathan Cohn (2013) docu-
ments the poor state of the US childcare system. For 
instance, a recent survey of care quality found most 
childcare operations to be either ‘fair’ or ‘poor’, with 
only 10 per cent identified as providing high-quality 
care. Regulation is generally limited and not well en-
forced, and only a minority of those surveyed met 
recommended standards (e.g., for caregiver-to-infant 
ratios). Education and training requirements for child-
care workers are low, and the pay is rarely much more 
than other low-skilled service workers: the median 
annual salary for a childcare worker is less than that 
of a parking lot attendant or janitor. Despite the low 
pay, financing childcare is a significant challenge for 
most families with, for instance, day care being more 
expensive than rent in 22 states.
Limited	public	resources	for	care.	There are few pub-
lic resources available to help defray those costs for 
families. Combining the value of tax breaks, direct 
services and cash grants, public spending on family 
benefits was only 1.2 per cent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) in 2009, compared to an OECD average of 
2.6 per cent and a Western European average of 3 per 
cent. Focusing on direct public supports for childcare, 
the United States spent only 0.4 per cent of its GDP 
on childcare and pre-school in 2009, quite low relative 
to the 0.7 per cent average for the OECD as a whole. 
Going back to Cohn, he sums up the lack of public 
support for childcare: “The United States has always 
been profoundly uncomfortable with the idea of sup-
porting child care outside the home, for reasons that 
inevitably trace back to beliefs over the proper role of 
women and mothers. At no point has a well-organized 
public day care system ever been considered the social 
ideal.” (Cohn 2013: 24)
Measuring	 the	 results. One of the starkest pieces of 
evidence of the low road is the tremendously high rates 
of poverty among children in the United States. Using a 
poverty threshold of 50 per cent of the population me-
dian, children younger than 18 had a poverty rate of 21.6 
per cent in 2008 compared to 12.6 per cent for the OECD 
as a whole and just 5.5 per cent among Nordic countries.
Data sources: Blau et al. (2010); the U.S. Census Bureau; and the OECD 
Family Database and the OECD Employment Database, June 2013.
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The regimes of Table 2-2 are contrasting categories 
of a fluid continuum. Individual economies may 
have features of each regime that render them 
somewhere in between the two poles. For instance, 
in addition to the GE and FRO cases, there is also 
the ‘traditional’ case, where men contribute primar-
ily financing and women contribute primarily time 
to social reproduction. This structure most often 
reflects family systems centred around paternal 
power and the conjugal bond, embedded in cultural 
rules that prescribe male authority over as well as 
responsibility for the protection and provisioning of 
women and children (Kabeer 1994). What happens 
in these sorts of societies when female labour force 
participation increases, and traditional family struc-
tures and divisions of productive and reproductive 
labour undergo change, depends on private and 
public decisions of the sort that set economies on 
either a high or low road path. Box 2-3 discusses one 
such transition in Taiwan.
BOX 2-3 
Transitioning out of a traditional distribution of social reproduction in Taiwan
In Taiwan, strong patriarchal traditions and inter-
generational obligations created high degrees of 
intra-family stratification based on gender and age, 
with unmarried daughters the lowest class in the 
family hierarchy (Greenhalgh 1985). The early years 
of Taiwan’s export-led boom were fuelled by the 
entry of these women into export factories. In the 
1970s, when Taiwan faced labour shortages, a state-
sponsored satellite factory system made industrial 
work more consistent with traditional female roles, 
enabling increases in the labour supply of wives and 
mothers (Hsiung 1996). This sort of structural flex-
ibility relative to women’s work and family roles is 
a feature that persists in Taiwanese labour markets 
today, and dovetails with expectations that women 
contribute financially to their families (Yu 2009). 
As a consequence, increases in female labour force 
participation have been large and sustained, going 
from 35.5 per cent in 1970 to 44.5 per cent in 1990 
and 50.2 per cent in 2012.17 Compared to other East 
Asian economies, which typically have some of the 
largest gender wage gaps in the world, women in 
Taiwan experience a gender wage gap closer to the 
norm for liberal advanced industrialized countries: 
the gender wage ratio for average monthly earnings 
in industry and services was 81.2 in 2012. 
From a distribution of social reproduction per-
spective, Taiwan illustrates the tensions for social 
reproduction as women’s paid work participation 
17 These figures include all women aged 15 and older.
increases and the traditional sexual division of 
labour is challenged. Let us consider whether these 
dynamics have drawn Taiwan closer to the low 
road/feminization of responsibility or high road/
gender egalitarian case. While childrearing in mar-
riage is the predominant norm, and fathers help 
financially support the family, Taiwanese men con-
tribute very little time to domestic labour (Yu 2009: 
19). And while Taiwan and its East Asian neigh-
bours are known as having strong developmental 
welfare states that have successfully built up the 
human capital of their labour forces in service to 
the needs of economic growth, there is very little 
public provision of care outside of investments in 
education and health (Kwon 2005; Pierson 2004; 
UNRISD 2010). A legacy of income equality and 
limits on immigration have meant that working 
women cannot rely on a supply of lower-income 
rural or migrant women for help with care. The care 
sector is small, market-based and largely unregu-
lated; most parents depend on older kin for help 
when they need it (Budig and Misra 2010; Yu 2009). 
For instance, in 2006, among married women 
of child-bearing age, the following childcare ar-
rangements prevailed: 66 per cent had no outside 
help, 26 per cent depended on relatives and the 
remaining 8 per cent depended on nannies, foreign 
servants and nurseries combined. In sum, then, 
as Taiwanese women have increased their labour 
force participation and financial contributions to 
the family, the obligations taken on by men and 
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2.3 
Combining aggregate demand and supply:  
Growth and reproduction
Table 2-3 shows how aggregate demand and sup-
ply relate to one another in ways that draw out the 
causal connections among growth, gender inequal-
ity and social reproduction. Instead of referring to 
the two sides as demand and supply, we use the 
more descriptive labels of growth and the distribu-
tion of social reproduction respectively. The result 
is four stylized regimes that we term (in clockwise 
order) time squeeze, mutual, wage squeeze and 
exploitation. To assess the differences among them, 
we consider the results of a decline in gender-based 
wage inequality and consequent increases in female 
labour force participation.
Starting in the upper left-hand corner, we have a 
combination of wage-led/altruistic growth with a low 
road distribution of social reproduction. In this regime, 
more gender equality in the form of higher wages for 
women in general – or higher wages for care workers in 
particular – supports investment and growth because 
it raises human capacities production and domestic 
aggregate demand by more than it cuts into profits. 
However, if these higher wages pull more women into 
the labour market, the time devoted to human ca-
pacities production declines and relationships in the 
wider economic system – from the structure of the 
paid care sector, to the lack of support from men for 
care to the lack of reproductive infrastructure – mean 
that the time decrease is also a human capacities pro-
duction decrease, manifesting as fertility decline and/
or a decrease in human capital-related investments. 
The more extensive the feminization of responsibility 
and obligation, the stronger these negative effects. 
We call this regime time squeeze to emphasize the 
trade-offs between the marketization of women’s 
work and the consequent time pressures on human 
capacities production. If they are substantial enough, 
the time squeeze effects of higher wages completely 
counterbalance their positive growth effects, leading 
to stagnation or growth path instabilities.
the state remain largely traditional in nature. This 
amounts to movement more towards the low road 
than the high road case, a sort of traditional regime 
with low road characteristics.
One of the results has been a marked increase in 
non-marriage: the percentage of never married 
women between ages 35 and 39 increased from 
1.2 per cent in 1970 to 15.9 per cent in 2005 (Jones 
2010: 20). Another is that Taiwan has one of the 
lowest fertility rates in the world: the total fertility 
rate was 1.27 in 2012 after reaching a low of 0.90 in 
2010. In recent years, the Taiwanese Government 
has responded by introducing a number of mea-
sures that make it easier for women to combine 
motherhood and work, including maternity and 
parental leave benefits as well as a new system 
of childcare subsidies and early childhood educa-
tion and care (Lin and Yang 2009, cited in Jones 
2011). Interestingly, they have veered away from 
more traditional pro-natalist policies such as 
cash grants for births because of strong opposi-
tion from Taiwanese feminists, who protested 
that this amounted to “buying feminine wombs 
for cash” (Lee 2009, cited in Jones 2011). While 
these measures have been credited with helping 
to raise fertility somewhat, whether they will be 
sufficient to counterbalance the pressures for 
structural transformation of the social reproduc-
tion system is unlikely. These dynamics also touch 
on a demand side issue: when the relations of 
social reproduction discourage child-rearing, 
investments in human capital will fall, lowering 
aggregate demand and threatening growth.
Data sources: Unless otherwise noted, the data discussed in 
this section come from the Directorate General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan).
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Moving to the upper right corner, with a high road 
distribution of social reproduction and wage-led/al-
truistic growth, the regime is labelled mutual because 
production and reproduction tend to reinforce one 
another. In this case, more gender wage equality raises 
growth because it increases human capacities invest-
ment and aggregate demand by more than it cuts into 
profits. Higher market participation among women 
induced by higher wages does lower the time available 
for human capacities production. But gender egalitar-
ian relations of reproduction, buoyed by strong public 
support for care and the availability of effective care 
commodities not only protect against time squeeze, 
they actually induce an increase in the production 
of human capacities (quantity and/or quality) in the 
context of higher incomes. From a citizen-worker-carer 
perspective, this is the win-win scenario.
The lower right corner of Table 2-3, which combines 
profit-led growth with a high road distribution of 
social reproduction, is termed wage squeeze be-
cause although higher wages for women enhance 
human capacities production, this is not enough to 
outweigh the negative impact that higher wages 
have on profits, overall investment and growth. One 
can think of relatively gender egalitarian relations 
accompanied by a structure of production that 
makes long-term investments in human capacities 
expensive or risky. The stronger the profit-led nature 
of the economy – for instance, the more open to the 
global economy or the more neoliberal its macro 
policy – the more pronounced these contradictions. 
The result is that policies promoting gender equal-
ity may be anathema to growth or make it unstable. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, if the promotion of 
gender equality via higher female labour participa-
tion actually lowers female wages because of higher 
labour supply, growth and human capacities produc-
tion may increase. 
The final regime, labelled exploitation, combines the 
profit-led and low road cases. In this scenario, higher 
wages for women lower growth because they cut 
into profits and capitalist investment by more than 
they raise human capacities investment. At the same 
time, the higher market participation brought about 
by higher wages for women actually lowers human 
capacities production because of the time squeeze 
type effects of the low road. These effects can be 
so pronounced that human capacities investment 
plays no role in moderating profit-led growth. Thus 
the term exploitation refers to how production and 
growth are predicated on exploiting women’s repro-
ductive labour and human resources in general. As 
the polar opposite of the mutual regime, it is the 
lose-lose scenario. 
TABLE 2-3 
Growth	and	social	reproduction
Supply:	The	distribution	of	social	reproduction
Demand:	Growth Low road: Feminization of responsibility  and obligation (FRO)
High road:
Gender egalitarian (GE)
Wage-led/ altruistic Time	squeeze
Higher wages for women are good for growth, 
but more market participation squeezes time 
and lowers human capacities production. 
Growth is elusive or unstable.
Mutual
Higher wages for women are good for growth, and 
more market participation increases human capaci-
ties production. Growth and social reproduction 
reinforce one another.
Profit-led/ 
individualistic
Exploitation
Higher wages for women lower growth, and 
more market participation squeezes time and 
lowers human capacities production. Growth 
is partly based on exploiting women’s labour 
and human resources.
Wage	squeeze
Higher wages for women lower growth, but more 
market participation enhances human capacities 
production. Growth is elusive or unstable.
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3. 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, 
SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 
AND GROWTH 
In this section we link the regimes of Table 2-3 with particular groups of economies. We 
organize the discussion by level of development and economic structure, closely following 
the categorizations set out in UNRISD (2010), the conceptual frames developed by Seguino 
(2010) and the data in Braunstein (2011). While we reference general issues of growth, par-
ticularly when differentiating between wage- and profit-led demand regimes, our primary 
focus is gender and the organization of social reproduction. We begin each section with 
summary observations on growth, economic structure and women’s employment, followed 
by an analysis of the provisioning of social welfare. Drawing these points together, we then 
situate the group in Table 2-3, evaluating the consequences of a decline in gender-based 
wage inequality and an increase in female labour force participation for growth  
and reproduction.18 
3.1 
Advanced industrialized economies
A standard structuralist analysis of most advanced in-
dustrialized economies (AIEs) would put them in the 
wage-led growth category (Stockhammer and Onaran 
2012). While these economies are certainly globally 
integrated, the size of the global sector relative to the 
18 It is important to note that this discussion of economic 
structure and women’s labour force participation is 
grounded in regimes of social reproduction and therefore 
does not necessarily follow the feminization U hypothesis – 
that women’s labour force participation declines and then 
increases as economies industrialize. We emphasize the 
diversity in labour participation within structural (economic 
and social reproduction) groupings that the feminization 
U prediction does not consider. Moreover, the empirical ro-
bustness of the feminization U pattern has been seriously 
challenged (Gaddis and Klasen 2013). Still, a good empirical 
question would be whether the predictions of this study, 
where economic structure combined with regimes of social 
reproduction determine women’s labour force participation 
and its consequences for growth, echo or contradict the em-
pirical literature on the feminization U.
domestic one means that domestic demand effects 
often outweigh circumstances abroad. Though of 
course there is variance within this group regard-
ing the extent to which this is true (the smaller and 
more externally oriented the economy, the more likely 
it will be profit-led), the ongoing failure of austerity 
programmes to lift Europe out of recession is evidence 
of the importance of domestic aggregate demand. 
This analysis does not, however, account for the role 
of social reproduction on either the demand or supply 
sides of the economy, a task to which we now turn.
The trajectory of development and employment 
among today’s AIEs involved a shift away from 
agriculture to industry and services and from self-
employment to wage employment (UNRISD 2010). 
Service sectors are the largest source of employ-
ment for both women and men, though there is 
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extensive gender segregation within services, with 
women concentrated in the types of jobs that are 
most likely to have a care component (Badgett and 
Folbre 1999). AIEs are generally characterized by high 
female labour force participation rates; significant 
variation within the AIE group corresponds to differ-
ences in their approaches to provisioning social welfare 
(UNRISD 2010).
The classic approach to evaluating social welfare in 
AIEs is Esping-Anderson’s (1990) three regimes of 
welfare capitalism: liberal, conservative-corporatist 
and social democratic. However, his analysis did not 
explicitly consider either gender or the provision of 
care (Razavi 2007; Orloff 1996). So we recast these 
categories in the context of social reproduction, 
drawing on the many insights of later writers who 
extended Esping-Anderson’s original analysis in ways 
that are gender-aware. At the outset we should note 
that all three groupings involve formal sector workers 
contributing to their benefits in a context of full or 
nearly full employment, with temporary forms of so-
cial insurance designed to deal with cyclical upheavals 
and transitory market failures (Heintz and Lund 2012). 
Perhaps because of their wealth and the more highly 
developed nature of their economies, all three also 
share some sort of universal entitlement to health 
care (with the exception of the United States) and ed-
ucation, though there is variation in the funding and 
reach of the latter (e.g., early childhood education).
3.1.1 
Liberal AIEs
Liberal AIEs rely primarily on market provisioning 
of social welfare, with the state taking on a limited 
and secondary role and benefits largely targeted and 
means-tested (Esping-Anderson 1996; Heintz and 
Lund 2012). This group includes New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, Australia and Canada. The most extreme 
variant is the US model, where markets supplement 
a very basic public safety net that is highly targeted 
(Esping-Anderson 1996). The result from a gender 
inequality perspective is a sort of two-tiered system 
of social welfare, with men’s insurance centred on 
labour market issues and women’s being family-
related and primarily means-tested social assistance 
(Orloff 1996). 
Thinking in terms of the social reproduction and 
growth framework, on the demand side the liberal 
approach diminishes the case for a wage-led growth 
regime. Social preferences can be individualistic in 
that, outside of education and health, investments in 
human capacities are largely a private matter. Bearing 
the responsibility for these investments is clearly an 
economic disadvantage, as evidenced by the fact 
that families with young children – especially those 
led by single women – have the highest poverty rates 
among the AIEs (Folbre 2008; Orloff 1996; UNRISD 
2010). This makes it difficult to conduct the sorts 
of long-term investments in human capacities that 
characterize altruistic growth regimes. We see this 
pressure manifested in Figure 2-1C, where Australia, 
Canada and the United States are classified as hav-
ing weak caring spirits and the United Kingdom is 
below the trendline.
On the supply side, there is a tendency towards a 
low road type of feminization of responsibility and 
obligation in that direct and indirect public provi-
sion of care services is limited, private care services 
are expensive, and women are more likely than men 
to take up the financial and time responsibilities of 
maintaining and investing in the future labour force 
(OECD 2012a; OECD 2012b). We thus might expect, 
at least for women outside the upper classes who 
cannot afford to compensate for the absence of the 
state and/or men in social reproduction, that female 
labour force participation is associated with stresses 
on the production of human capacities. 
In terms of Table 2-3, we place liberal AIEs in the 
exploitation quadrant, though the United States is 
certainly the most pronounced example of this group 
(others with more public supports for reproduction 
might be closer to the wage squeeze case). Speaking 
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specifically of the United States, high inequality 
overall and the feminization of responsibility and ob-
ligation are core aspects of its growth model (see Box 
2-2 for more detail). Under the limits of this struc-
ture, raising wages for women or care sector workers 
may threaten growth to the extent that it cuts into 
profits by more than it raises human capacities. Such 
reforms must be buttressed by public measures that 
strengthen the connection between higher wages 
and investments in the future labour force, moving 
the economy towards the mutual case. Alternatively, 
changes in institutional arrangements that make it 
easier to combine work and care could achieve the 
same results (Folbre 2013). 
3.1.2 
Conservative-corporatist AIEs
Conservative-corporatist AIEs have a well-developed 
welfare state that incorporates just about everyone, 
though access to benefits tends to be determined 
by employment status and class position (Heintz 
and Lund 2012; Orloff 1996). The state plays a bigger 
role than in liberal regimes, but wider public fund-
ing of care supports lots of private service providers 
(Heintz and Lund 2012; Razavi 2011). Geographically, 
these regimes are associated with continental 
and Southern Europe, while recent social welfare 
reforms in Japan suggest movement towards this 
model as well (Campbell et al. 2010; Peng 2005). 
In terms of gender and social reproduction, we can 
characterize these regimes as ‘familial’ in the sense 
that much of social reproduction is presumed to be 
done by women within the context of the family. 
Social welfare policies are designed to be accessed 
through a male breadwinner, encouraging financial 
dependence of mothers on fathers and the persis-
tence of a traditional sexual division of labour. For 
instance, Spain’s generous maternity leave poli-
cies combined with one of the least generous child 
benefit provisions in Europe discourage women’s 
market participation and lower fertility (Warnecke 
2008). Alternatively, policies in countries such as 
Austria and Germany are designed to enable women 
to combine work with their traditional unpaid care 
responsibilities, such as giving cash subsidies to help 
families pay for care services or legislating the right 
of parents to work part-time without losing benefits 
(Daly 2011). 
Looking to the distribution of social reproduction in 
Table 2-3, the corporatist familial model seems to fall 
somewhere in between the low and high road cases, 
though individual countries may be in one category or 
the other. There is more public support for care than 
in the low road regime, but that support tends to 
preserve women’s responsibility for social reproduc-
tion and is associated with the growth of low-paying, 
low-skill care services (Razavi and Staab 2010). In a 
number of countries in this group, particularly in 
Southern Europe, not much is spent on family policy 
overall, though others in Western Europe are more 
generous (Daly 2001; UNRISD 2010). For instance, in 
2009 France spent about 4 per cent of GDP on family 
benefits, Austria and Germany about 3 per cent and 
Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain less than 2 per cent.19 
While it is difficult for women in this group to com-
bine market and nonmarket work, to the extent that 
traditional family structures persist, men do make 
financial contributions to household reproduction. 
One of the resulting contradictions is that even if 
higher wages and market participation for women 
are associated with more human capacities produc-
tion, increasing female labour force participation may 
also induce fewer contributions to social reproduc-
tion from men as the familial model breaks down. 
Women may also, in such circumstances, elect to bow 
out of social reproduction by putting off or avoid-
ing childrearing. Such a result is evidence of the low 
road case.  
On the growth side, the fertility decline experienced 
in parts of Europe and Japan is indicative of how 
human capacities investment can give way when 
social preferences are wed to the persistence of 
traditional structures and their gender division of 
19 This data is from the OECD Family Database, Table PF1.1A.
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labour, potentially threatening long-term growth. 
Looking to the results of Figure 2-1C, however, we see 
a number of countries in this group (France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain) characterized as having strong caring 
spirits. So in terms of wage- versus profit-led growth 
regimes, we put this group in the wage-led category. 
But there is more diversity on the supply side, as evi-
denced by different public commitments to care and 
the relationship between female labour force partici-
pation and fertility (see Box 3-1).
BOX 3-1 
Familialism, fertility and time squeeze
It is a ‘stylized fact’ that increasing female labour 
force participation is associated with fertility de-
cline, but looking at OECD countries as in Figure 
3-1, the relationship seems to be reversed. That is, 
higher female labour force participation appears to 
be associated with higher fertility. A large literature 
focuses on the ease of combining motherhood and 
work as a key explanation of this counterintuitive 
result, with the size and structure of public support 
for working mothers, as well as the extent of gender 
equity in home production being important deter-
minants of this relationship (Del Boca and Locatelli 
2008; de Laat and Sevilla-Sanz 2011). Almost all of 
the countries in the conservative-corporatist group 
of social welfare states have extremely low fertility 
(e.g., Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
France is a clear exception. 
Fertility comes into our model of growth and social 
reproduction on the demand side: when lower quan-
tity (declining fertility) is not compensated by higher 
quality (human capital), declining human capacities 
investment will ultimately cut into growth. But the 
relationship between female labour force participa-
tion and fertility can also be taken as a symptom 
of the structure of relations on the supply side. In 
growth regimes characterized by strong caring spir-
its, such as those in Western and Southern Europe, 
when women have a difficult time combining 
motherhood and work (as in the case of familialism), 
we have a low road regime of social reproduction, 
and time squeeze constrains economic growth. In 
other words, the persistence of women’s traditional 
responsibilities for care in the family, combined with 
few alternatives to providing such care, means that 
the promise of less gender inequality in the labour 
market is limited by trade-offs with social reproduc-
tion. France’s high fertility rates are a testament to 
family policies that draw the provision of care out of 
the family and into the public sphere, making for a 
high road supply side (Salles et al. 2010). 
Considering the United Kingdom and the United 
States, however, seems to contradict this pattern. 
Both have less supportive family policies than 
Germany but higher fertility and comparable 
work participation among women. At issue here 
is whether and how social reproduction moves 
out of the family (Balbo et al. 2013). In the United 
Kingdom and the United States, as well as the lib-
eral AIEs more generally, this defamilialization has 
been largely market-based. By contrast, Northern 
Europe has transitioned via an expansion in the 
public provision of care (see section 3.1.3 on social 
democratic AIEs). Both regimes are consistent with 
higher rates of female labour force participation 
and fertility, though with markedly different results 
for the distribution of social reproduction.
The result is that the majority of this group falls 
into the time squeeze scenario of Table 2-3, where 
the impact of public support for care is blunted by 
its familialistic approach and the lack of a buoyant, 
professionalized care sector. One clear exception to 
this pattern is France, which has devoted substan-
tial public resources to supporting care outside of 
the family. Getting back to the question of social 
reproduction and growth, higher wages for women 
are good for growth, but highly familial, privatized 
structures of care mean that higher wages and mar-
ket participation among women may pose a threat to 
human capacities production and ultimately compro- 
mise growth.
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3.1.3 
Social democratic AIEs
Social democratic AIEs are characterized by strong 
welfare states with universal coverage and lots of 
public provision of services for children, the elderly and 
disabled people (Heintz and Lund 2012; Razavi 2011). 
Geographically, these regimes are concentrated among 
the countries in Northern Europe. Labour market 
policies promote full employment and wage equality 
across different groups of workers, ensuring ample tax 
revenue and lower reliance on the welfare state (Esping-
Anderson 1996). From a gender and social reproduction 
perspective, an individualistic model of entitlement 
and extensive public services support those who do 
care work, enabling very high rates of female labour 
force participation without the loss in fertility experi-
enced elsewhere, as illustrated in Figure 2-2 (Gupta et 
al. 2008; Orloff 1996). Poverty rates among children and 
female-headed households are also the lowest of the 
AIE group (Folbre 2008; UNRISD 2010). On the down-
side, the generous benefits proffered by public sector 
employment contribute to women concentrating their 
FIGURE 3-1 
Female	labour	force	participation	and	fertility	in	the	OECD,	2010
Source: Author’s illustration of World Development Indicators data.
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employment in the relatively lower-paying jobs of this 
sector, suppressing their wages and making these 
among the most gender segregated labour markets in 
the world (Gupta et al. 2008).
Looking at Table 2-3, the features of the social demo-
cratic case reflect those of the mutual regime, where 
wage-led growth is combined with a high road, gen-
der egalitarian distribution of social reproduction. 
Higher wages for women in the public sector, for 
instance, would be consonant with more domestic 
aggregate demand and increased investments in 
human capacities, either through private spend-
ing or public provision financed by higher taxes. 
The high road supply side reinforces this result, as 
higher wages and market participation among 
women raise human capacities production. However, 
leakages caused by global demand dependence, or 
lower investments in developing human capacities in 
the long term, could push these economies into the 
wage squeeze regime. The latter threat is one that 
mirrors anxieties that these economies can no lon-
ger afford their generous social welfare programmes, 
particularly as societies age or become more globally 
integrated in ways that make labour costs more sig-
nificant in determining absolute and comparative 
advantages. Recent efforts to raise investments in 
children among a number of European countries 
are one possible response (more will be said about 
this below when we discuss social investment). But 
caution must be exercised to ensure these measures 
maintain wage-led growth instead of just shifting 
the economy from a high to a low road distribution 
of social reproduction.
3.2 
Semi-industrialized export-oriented economies
Semi-industrialized export oriented economies (SIEOs) 
 refer to middle-income countries, primarily located 
in East Asia but with a second generation emerging 
in Southeast Asia, that have successfully pursued an 
export-led growth and industrialization strategy.20 
Advancing up the industrial ladder is built on ac-
cess to global resources (e.g., foreign exchange and 
investment) in the context of state-led industrial 
policies. This group, especially those located in East 
Asia, industrialized later and faster than today’s 
AIEs but experienced a path of growth and struc-
tural change that is relatively close to the standard 
AIE development trajectory in terms of sectoral 
and employment transitions (UNRISD 2010). These 
economies have among the highest female labour 
force participation rates in the world, and industry 
is a significant employer of both women and men. 
Gender-based wage inequality is extremely high by 
global standards, reflecting an important aspect of 
the SIEO development strategy: export success built 
20 The first generation of these – Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan – are considered high income now; 
this analysis refers not so much to their current income 
status but their industrialization histories and the ongoing 
export orientation of their economies.
on a low-wage, largely female labour force. However, 
when exports and industries upgrade, there is de-
feminization of industrial employment (Tejani and 
Milberg 2010). Beyond education and health services, 
both key aspects of the SIEO development model, the 
service sector is relatively small. 
The welfare state associated with the East Asian 
model is often referred to as ‘developmental’ in that 
its programmes were designed to support economic 
efficiency and growth, and social policy focused on 
maximizing the employment and skills of the work-
force with particular emphasis on education and, 
later, health. Social insurance was limited for the most 
part to industrial workers, financed by employer and 
employee contributions and operated at arms length 
from the government, all of which contributed to a 
highly privatized, familial model of social welfare pro-
vision reliant on continuing growth successes (Kwon 
2005; Peng 2011; Pierson 2004). 
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Ha-joon Chang (2004) takes issue with the conse-
quently common characterization of the East Asian 
approach as neglectful of social policy, emphasizing 
the equalizing effects of economic policies such 
as: land reform in Republic of Korea, Taiwan and 
later Malaysia and Thailand; the provision of public 
housing in Hong Kong and Singapore; Malaysia’s pro-
grammes to close the gap between ethnic Chinese 
and Malays; and restraining luxury consumption to 
preserve foreign exchange. According to Chang, the 
contributions that these and other economic policies 
made to social cohesion, political stability and indus-
trial peace created the circumstances for long-term 
investment and growth and should be credited with 
their positive social welfare effects in the same man-
ner as more direct programmes. However, the Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997–98 complicates this 
equivalence, as increases in unemployment and eco-
nomic insecurity rendered the presumption of full 
employment and high growth inadequate for social 
protection. A number of social policy reforms that ex-
tended protections were introduced, particularly in 
the Republic of Korea, but many of these were in the 
pipeline pre-AFC and/or phased out after economic 
growth returned (Kwon 2005).
From a gender and social reproduction perspective, 
the SIEO model of social welfare provision can be 
characterized as a familialistic male breadwinner 
model with a traditional and fairly rigid gender di-
vision of labour. Women and families are presumed 
to provide care in the home (or, less frequently, to 
purchase it privately), with high (but declining) co-
residency among the elderly and their adult children 
(Peng 2011; UNRISD 2010). Employment protections 
and social insurance systems favour mostly male 
full-time workers, and direct public support for fami-
lies is minimal and means-tested (Kown 2005; Peng 
2011). Even though incremental expansions in public 
provisioning have been introduced in the more eco-
nomically advanced countries to address population 
ageing, fertility decline and the push for greater 
gender equality at work and at home, social welfare 
supports for care are still on the whole quite limited, 
and what extra-familial options exist are largely 
privately provided by the market (Chang 2004; Peng 
2011; UNRISD 2010). 
Looking now to the regimes in Table 2-3, and begin-
ning with growth, the export dependence of SIEOs 
exerts a strong pull towards the profit-led category. 
From this perspective, higher wages for women are 
likely to detract from export competitiveness and 
growth. Even among the higher income economies of 
this group, where female wages are no longer so cen-
tral to export competitiveness, the combined threat of 
import leakages and capital outflows when wages rise 
is conducive to a profit-led growth regime. In smaller 
SIEO economies, these effects are more dominant. 
However, the extensive investments in education 
and health, both public and private, that are associ-
ated with developmental welfare states and the East 
Asian model weight these economies towards a more 
wage-led, altruistic growth regime in their emphasis 
on long-term investments in human capacities. We 
can see this result reflected in Figure 2-1C, where the 
extent of investments in human capacities put the 
Republic of Korea and Singapore in the strong caring 
spirits category. With the overall movement towards 
more liberalized finance and trade among the higher 
income SIEOs after the AFC, however, and the increas-
ingly competitive marketplace for global exports, this 
counter is less determinative. On balance, then, we 
put SIEOs in the profit-led growth category, primarily 
because of their global orientation. 
In terms of the distribution of social reproduction, the 
strong structure of familial provisioning with little 
direct support from the state recalls the corporatist-
conservative regime, Southern Europe in particular. 
There is not quite a feminization of responsibility and 
obligation because of the persistence of traditional 
family structures and consequent contributions from 
men and extended family. Given the emphasis of many 
families on investments in children, higher incomes 
for women should be associated with more human 
capacities production, at least in terms of quality. But 
there is little commodification of care work and so 
options for replacing time when female wages and 
labour force participation and attachment increase are 
limited, making it very difficult for women to combine 
market and nonmarket work and ultimately lowering 
human capacities production and investment. Recent 
and stark declines in marriage rates across the East and 
Southeast Asian region are a testament to this tension 
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and suggest that the tug of the low road is strong as 
many working women delay and defer marriage and 
child-rearing (the former almost always precedes the 
latter in these countries) (Jones 2010). (Box 2-3 discuss-
es this dynamic in the case of Taiwan.) This result also 
feeds back into the case for profit-led growth, pulling 
SIEOs closer to the exploitation regime. 
In terms of Table 2-3, SIEOs are on the border between 
exploitation and wage squeeze. If traditional family 
structures continue to break down, and the state does 
not expand its support for social reproduction in ways 
that promote gender equality, the economy will move 
squarely into the exploitation case. Conversely, if the 
economy shifts into a high road path of social repro-
duction, the challenge will be wage squeeze: higher 
wages and market participation may enhance the 
production of human capacities, but they also threat-
en growth because of higher labour costs. Ultimately, 
for the win-win scenario of the mutual regime to pre-
vail, SIEOs must address both their growth and social 
reproduction regimes.
3.3 
Dualistic economies
Dualism refers to middle-income countries character-
ized by a significant bifurcation between a small formal 
sector, where jobs are associated with high wages and 
good benefits, and a large informal sector with lots of 
insecurity, low wages and few opportunities for up-
ward mobility (UNRISD 2010). These sorts of economies 
also exhibit a high degree of income inequality and 
include a number of the higher-income countries in 
the Latin American region, as well as countries such 
as the Philippines and South Africa where high rates 
of unemployment, underemployment and inequal-
ity accompany concentrations of economic dynamism 
and associated wealth. Female labour force participa-
tion rates are the lowest among all of the economy 
groupings discussed. Agriculture tends to be a bigger 
employer of men than women in this group, and the 
(primarily informal) service sectors are large and im-
portant sources of employment for women. Indeed, the 
economic inequality that characterizes dualistic econo-
mies is directly associated with paid domestic service 
as a significant source of employment for women, as 
wealthy families can afford it and lots of low-income 
women need jobs (Razavi and Staab 2010). 
This category of economies is a wide one, with a di-
versity of economic and social histories that is key to 
understanding the shape of social welfare provision. 
For many countries, the neoliberal era of the 1980s and 
early 1990s brought with it reforms of social insurance 
in line with neoliberal principles of privatization and 
liberalization (especially in Latin America) in an effort 
to reduce fiscal deficits and expand coverage – neither 
of which ultimately transpired. Partly in response 
to the failures of neoliberal programmes to deliver 
growth or improvements in well-being, the late 1990s 
and 2000s hosted an expansion of social assistance 
in the forms of antipoverty programmes, condi-
tional cash transfers and non-contributory pensions 
(Barrientos 2011). A common theme among them is 
a focus on raising social floors, using social policy to 
reduce poverty and enhance opportunities for poor 
children and economic security for the families that 
care for them. For instance, Bolsa Familia in Brazil and 
Opportunidades in Mexico, which give conditional 
cash transfers to poor mothers in exchange for ensur-
ing their children meet certain health and education 
requirements, have been credited with demonstra-
bly lowering poverty rates (UNRISD 2010). In South 
Africa, where the legacy of HIV and AIDS created a 
relatively high level of state social provisioning, the 
Child Support Grant, a means-tested but otherwise 
unconditional cash grant given to a child’s primary 
caregiver, is unique in that it targets caregivers of 
any sex (Budlender and Lund 2011; Razavi 2007, 2011). 
Other programmes, such as those in Chile and Mexico, 
target early childhood education to encourage pa-
rental employment, particularly among mothers, via 
providing direct subsidies to private and quasi-public 
service providers on behalf of low-income households 
(Staab and Gerhard 2011).
Economic Growth and 
Social Reproduction 27
While these and other programmes like them are 
important responses to the ongoing dualism in 
economic fortunes and persistent poverty that charac-
terize these economies, the results are more equivocal 
from a gender and distribution of social reproduction 
perspective (Molyneux 2007). Almost all conditional 
cash transfer programmes (with the exception of 
South Africa) require some time commitment by 
participants, necessitating a reorganization of house-
hold time patterns with potential impacts on time to 
engage in paid labour. Because of gendered norms, it 
is primarily women who perform the unpaid tasks of 
fulfilling conditions required to access programme 
payments, and thus such programmes may actually 
reduce women’s relative access to income or gender 
equality, even as children’s status improves. For in-
stance, in a review of the PROGRESA programme (the 
precursor to Opportunidades) in Mexico, researchers 
found that the positive impact of increased resources 
in the household was on net perceived as a positive 
thing, but that women also bore increased time bur-
dens because of compensating for more demands on 
their time by working longer as opposed to getting 
more help from other household members or market 
services (Adato and Roopnaraine 2010). 
Thinking in terms of the regimes in Table 2-3, these sorts 
of cash payments and other anti-poverty programmes 
are cast in the context of a gender structure character-
ized by a traditional sexual division of labour combined 
with high rates of female household headship and out-
of-wedlock births (Budlender and Lund 2011; Esteve et al. 
2012). The result is a strong bias towards the feminiza-
tion of responsibility and obligation associated with the 
low road distribution of social reproduction. And while 
social policy reforms exert a pull towards more high 
road, gender egalitarian relations, the ongoing reliance 
on women’s time is counter-productive in this respect. 
Other aspects of the supply side reinforce these 
low road patterns. Cash transfers for care are not a 
complete substitute for good, publicly provided ser-
vices, as demonstrated among the AIEs (UNRISD 2010). 
Generally low wages for care sector workers, and the 
BOX 3-2 
Costa Rica: Universalism in a dualistic economy
The universalist approach to social protection in 
Costa Rica proffers an instructive example for dualist 
economies. Its approach is built on the right to basic 
social citizenship and includes universal education 
and health care, as well as expanding the reach of 
social insurance by widening the scope of its contribu-
tors and providing protections for those unable to 
contribute (UNRISD 2010). Total spending on social in-
surance is high, family allowances have been around 
for more than 30 years and there is a lot of solidarity 
for redistribution (ibid). At the same time, there has 
been an increase in the proportion of poor house-
holds headed by women since the 1990s, a seemingly 
counter-intuitive outcome. Chant (2008) links the two 
trends together, however, and argues that it is not the 
case that women are more likely to be poor today than 
in prior eras in Costa Rica, but that women are increas-
ingly choosing to become household heads precisely 
because of the expanded availability of social welfare 
supports for doing so. This result is indicative of more 
gender egalitarianism and movement towards a high 
road strategy of social reproduction. 
Costa Rica is thus closer to the wage squeeze regime 
of Table 2-3, which combines profit-led growth with 
the high road of social reproduction. The result is 
a bit of a razor’s edge in terms of the relationship 
between gender equality and growth: higher wages 
for women may slow growth, but more market par-
ticipation enhances human capacities production. 
In this case, continuing to improve women’s well-
being and human capacities production through 
public provisioning of social welfare might proffer 
the increases in labour productivity necessary to 
underwrite increases in incomes without sacrificing 
growth. Such a course is suggested by Costa Rica’s 
performance in Figure 2-1B, where achievements in 
human capabilities are above what the record of its 
income group would predict.
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causal connection between income inequality and 
the proliferation of domestic services for the wealthy, 
also contribute to the low road case. On balance, then, 
we would expect higher market participation among 
women to exert downward pressure on human capaci-
ties production as a result of time squeeze-type effects. 
Current experiments in social policy may alleviate 
some of the monetary needs of social reproduction, 
but as long as they do not address the problem of time 
and continue to rely on women providing the bulk of 
unpaid care, increasing female labour force participa-
tion may compromise human capacities.
From a growth perspective, extant social policies 
certainly strengthen the care component of the total 
investment function by facilitating investments in 
long-term human capacities production, particularly 
among children. But the balance of the demand side 
in dualistic economies is squarely profit-led. The cur-
rent structures of domestic production, in particular 
the capital intensity in industry and the labour inten-
sity in services and agriculture, do not produce much 
high quality employment, as reflected by the term du-
alism. Global conditions are key determinants of the 
economic fortunes of all of these economies. Some, 
such as Mexico, are export-oriented manufacturers 
along the lines of SIEO economies. In these economies 
higher wages will detract from export competitive-
ness and growth. Others, such as Argentina and Chile, 
are more dependent on commodities exports. In these 
cases, when global commodity prices are high, higher 
wages may be associated with more imports and not 
an expansion of domestic aggregate demand because 
imports are cheap relative to domestically produced 
goods. However, when global commodity prices 
are low, increasing wages could have a net positive 
impact on domestic aggregate demand, depending 
on the role of imports in domestic consumption and 
how wary policy makers are of inflation.21 Regardless 
of industrial structure, all of these countries are highly 
susceptible to the vagaries of the global financial sys-
tem and fears of inflation, leading to the adoption of 
neoliberal macroeconomic policy principles to man-
age risk and volatility. 
The result is a strong tendency towards a profit-led 
regime, where higher wages for women are likely 
to be associated with lower growth unless simul-
taneous policy and structural changes render these 
increases consonant with a net increase in domestic 
aggregate demand. At the same time, if higher wag-
es induce higher female labour force participation, 
the consequent time squeeze on human capacities 
production puts this group in the same regime as 
the liberal AIEs: exploitation. In this context, more 
gender equality threatens growth partly because of 
persistent inequalities in the gender distribution of 
social reproduction. Stronger supports for women 
doing paid work will weaken these causal links, 
but they must be accompanied by changes on the 
demand side to avoid merely shifting from an exploi-
tation to a wage squeeze regime. 
21 For those who want more detail, here is one scenario. A decline 
in commodity prices will induce depreciation of the exchange 
rate as global buyers need less of a country’s currency to pur-
chase its exports. A possible consequence is ‘pass through’, 
when increases in the domestic price of imports (because of 
exchange rate depreciation) cause an increase in domestic 
inflation. If the government is worried about inflation, as is 
the fashion in monetary policy these days, it will respond by 
employing contractionary macro policy, e.g., raising interest 
rates. The result is less investment, slower growth and an ap-
preciated real exchange rate – forces that counter the initial 
effects of the decline in commodity prices.
Economic Growth and 
Social Reproduction 29
BOX 3-3 
Addressing time squeeze in Guatemala
Guatemala is a low-income agricultural economy 
with some of the features of its dualistic neighbours 
in the Latin American region. While the agrarian sec-
tor is an important source of exports and employment 
for men (44 per cent of men’s employment), women’s 
employment is concentrated in services and manu-
facturing (63 and 20 per cent, respectively.  Much of 
women’s manufacturing employment stems from the 
maquiladora sector (Quisumbing et al. 2007). Rapid 
urbanization has been associated with informalization, 
with informal jobs accounting for 64 and 50 per cent 
of women’s and men’s urban employment, respectively, 
in 2006. Poverty rates are extremely high – 55 per cent 
of the population was identified as living in poverty in 
2006.22 And wealth concentration is associated with 
land ownership, a legacy of highly unequal systems 
of land appropriation and allocation that contributed 
to Guatemala’s 36-year civil war, which ended in 1996 
(Wittman and Saldívar-Tanaka 2006).
In terms of our model of growth and social reproduc-
tion, like other LIAEs Guatemala is classified as having 
a combination of wage-led growth and a feminization 
of responsibility and obligation. On the growth side, 
the results illustrated in Figure 2-1A, where Guatemala 
is classified as exhibiting the ‘caring spirits’ that are 
associated with wage-led growth, are a testament to 
this feature. But persistent poverty, inequality and in-
security, including a high incidence of men’s violence 
against women, make fulfilling this potential an 
ongoing challenge (UNICEF et al. 2013). On the social 
reproduction side, a number of studies conducted in 
Guatemala demonstrate how women’s income and 
time are more closely associated with investments in 
children and human capacities than men’s are (Engle 
1993; Katz 1995). This connection is reflected by that 
fact that Guatemala’s conditional cash transfer pro-
gramme, Mi Familia Progressa, instituted in 2008 and 
designed to improve health, nutrition and education 
22 The definition of poverty used is that of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and refers to not 
having enough resources to meet basic nutritional and non-
nutritional needs. For more information, see the technical note 
at: http://website.eclac.cl/sisgen/SisGen_Badeinso_estimacio-
nes_pobreza_cepal.asp?idioma=I (accessed 3 May 2012).
among poor children, distributes cash grants directly 
to mothers (Gammage 2010). The rising incidence of 
female headship, which stood at about one quarter of 
all households in 2006, means that women are respon-
sible for an increasing share of reproductive costs. At 
the same time, social public expenditure is low (8.1 per 
cent of GDP in 2009, one of the lowest rates in Latin 
America), and there is a scarcity of reproductive infra-
structure and services. And there are few options for 
non-familial childcare, especially for low-income fami-
lies. All of these features contribute to Guatemala’s low 
road path of social reproduction.
The result of this combination of wage-led growth and 
the low road is that increases in women’s wages and/
or female labour force participation are likely to be ac-
companied by time squeeze, potentially compromising 
the production of human capacities. Evidence of such 
a dynamic can be found in research on women’s time 
poverty, where one third of women were found to be 
time poor compared to 14 per cent of men (Gammage 
2010). The same study found more time poverty in 
urban than in rural areas, indicating that increasing 
participation in paid work has not resulted in a con-
comitant decline in the demands of unpaid work, as 
the time squeeze scenario would predict. 
One way to consider the potential consequences 
of time squeeze, and what policy can do, is by look-
ing to the Hogares Comunitarios Programme (HCP). 
HCP, which was piloted in 1991 in Guatemala City, is 
a community-based day-care programme in which 
women provide care in their homes in exchange for 
support from the state and contributions from par-
ticipating families. A close review of the programme 
found improved nutritional outcomes for children 
who attended, both while at day-care and at home, a 
result that is associated with long-term cognitive and 
educational benefits (Leroy et al. 2012; Malucio et al. 
2009). But many challenges remain. The reach of the 
programme is extremely limited, care is underfunded, 
day-care workers are not well trained and less time is 
spent on educational activities than anticipated (Ruel 
and Quisumbing 2006). However, a study comparing 
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3.4  
Low-income agricultural economies
Low-income agricultural economies (LIAEs) are 
primarily agrarian and are concentrated in South 
Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America. 
Women have high labour force participation rates 
and their work is concentrated in the agricultural 
sector – even more so than men’s. Almost all of this 
work is informal, with women participating in pro-
duction most often as smallholders, causal wage 
workers or contributing family workers (UNRISD 
2010). In South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, service 
sectors tend to be quite limited as generators of 
employment and care commodities, proffering few 
substitutes for women’s time (Braunstein 2011). In 
Latin America, however, informalized service sectors 
are a large source of employment for women, but af-
fordable care commodities are out of reach for most 
(Braunstein and Seguino 2013). 
Systems of social welfare are characterized as in-
formal, gendered and familial, with very limited 
involvement of the state. A number of countries in 
the LIAE group have the type of cash transfer and 
child development schemes that bring to mind the 
social policy experimentation of the dualist model. 
However, LIAE programmes are more limited in 
terms of depth and scope. Programmes that do 
exist often rely on voluntary work from the fam-
ily and community, which in turn is dependent on 
unpaid, mostly female labour as well as external 
funding routed through national and international 
non-governmental organizations (Martínez Franzoni 
2008; Martínez Franzoni and Vooren 2011; Razavi 
2011; UNRISD 2010). For example, preschool and 
child nutrition and school retention programmes in 
Nicaragua have recently expanded, but many are de-
pendent on external funding and volunteer labour, 
especially from the mothers of targeted children 
(UNRISD 2010). Field research in the United Republic 
of Tanzania on community care programmes for HIV 
and AIDS patients found that volunteers did a lot of 
work without getting paid, and that the structure of 
external finance challenges the sustainability and 
ultimate effectiveness of these programmes as orga-
nizations shift provisioning to attract funds (UNRISD 
2010). India probably has the widest array of targeted 
social welfare programmes among countries in the 
LIAE group, including the largest childhood nutrition 
programme in the world, a plethora of cash transfer 
schemes and a rural employment guarantee. But 
these, too, often depend on low-paid or unpaid vol-
unteer labour from women (especially the ones for 
children) and suffer from a multiplicity of structures 
working mothers utilizing the HCP and a control 
group found that the HCP mothers were more likely 
to be engaged in formal employment and have 
higher incomes than those in the control group, 
with the latter often combining informal work and 
childcare partly because of the lack of external child-
care options (Leroy et al. 2012; Ruel and Quisumbing 
2006). Despite the problems identified in the HCP, 
the quality of care is likely to be higher than that 
received by children whose mothers combine work 
and care at home (Leroy et al. 2012).
Research on the success and challenges of the 
HCP illustrates how the lack of good care options 
can restrict growth. On the supply side, labour 
productivity is kept down because women’s care 
responsibilities limit them to low productiv-
ity, informal sector work. On the demand side, 
long-term investments in human capacities are 
constrained by the lower quality care that chil-
dren receive as a result. In terms of policy, the goal 
would be to scale up programmes such as HCP so 
that women’s care responsibilities no longer pose 
a potential squeeze on time, entailing a move-
ment towards a more gender egalitarian, high 
road strategy of social reproduction.
Data sources: Data on employment are from ILOSTAT and 
CEPALSTAT databases. All other data is from CEPALSTAT data-
base unless otherwise indicated.
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and goals that reflect political patronage more than 
a cohesive vision of social welfare (Palriwala and 
Neetha 2011).
From a gender perspective, the limited scope 
of public provisions for social welfare services 
and reproductive infrastructure, the reliance on 
traditional family and extended kin networks of 
welfare provisioning that are highly gendered 
and the lack of alternatives to family care put 
LIAEs as a group squarely on the low road of social 
reproduction. And though households in LIAEs are 
extended and complex, the high rates of lone female 
parenting and household headship in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America also indicate a feminization 
of responsibility and obligation with regard to the 
distribution of social reproduction. The result is 
that higher market participation among women 
may be associated with lower human capacities 
production because of pressures on time and an 
inability to compensate for these by purchasing 
care commodities or raising the productivity of 
nonmarket work. At the same time, we must note 
that middle and upper class urban women in LIAEs 
have more access to care commodities and the type 
of reproductive infrastructure that make combining 
market and nonmarket work less of a zero-sum 
prospect (Razavi 2007). However, the vast majority 
of women responsible for social reproduction in 
LIAEs do not have these alternatives.
On the growth side, the structure of production in 
LIAEs, with most of the labour force engaged in in-
formal agrarian work that generates low earnings, 
means higher incomes are likely to expand domestic 
aggregate demand by much more than they lower 
capitalist profit shares and consequent investment. 
This is particularly true for women, who are the 
mainstay of subsistence food production in LIAEs but 
face unequal access to land, credit and agricultural 
inputs (FAO 2011). Indeed, raising returns to women’s 
work could well expand investments in both human 
and non-human capital as women use higher in-
comes to expand agricultural productivity as well as 
investments in human capacities (Seguino and Were 
2013). This makes growth in LIAEs likely to be wage-
led, and higher wages for women are thus good 
for growth. 
However, the low road distribution of social reproduc-
tion means that higher wages and growth come at 
the cost of women’s time, and the consequent time 
squeeze could compromise the production of human 
capacities to such an extent that growth is ultimately 
elusive or unstable. These are the contradictions of the 
time squeeze regime in Table 2-3. In this sort of context, 
it is particularly important for governments to com-
plement higher incomes with a movement towards 
the high road model of social reproduction, including 
more public provisioning of care and reproductive 
infrastructure, and expanding markets for care while 
ensuring that the consequent jobs pay good wages 
and the associated quality of care commodities is high. 
These sorts of provisions are quite different than those 
that expand services based on low-paid or volunteer 
labour. The time bind of care responsibilities must be 
alleviated in ways that preserve and enhance the pro-
duction of human capacities and do not just free up 
women for more market participation at the cost of 
social reproduction.
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4. 
THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT STATE
The rise of the social investment state, alternatively termed the new developmental welfare 
state, is linked with the increasing volatility of global markets and neoliberal structures of 
macroeconomic policy management and global integration. Traditional models of social 
protection were deemed insufficient to effectively counterbalance the negative impacts of 
new economic realities, and so a new model of state activism in managing human capital 
investment emerged (Jenson 2010).24 
Experiments in progressive social policies in Latin 
America, as well as social welfare reforms in a number 
of European countries, reflect this new perspective. 
At the centre is a strong emphasis on providing care 
for children in ways that target the development of 
their human capital (Daly 2011; Jenson 2010). Indeed, 
investing in human capital has been promoted by the 
finance ministries of Germany, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom (Jenson 2010). Beyond investing in children, 
labour market policies have taken on a new sort of 
prominence as a delivery mechanism for social welfare, 
at least in Europe, and there is a shift in philosophy from 
passive income maintenance to encouraging participa-
tion in paid work (ibid.). For instance, the ‘flexicurity’ 
approach, which first emerged in Denmark, combines 
labour market flexibility with social security for un-
employed workers and active labour market policies 
designed to retrain and reskill workers and get them 
back to work (Heintz and Lund 2012).
The new policy consensus also encourages moth-
ers to work for pay. At the same time, cash benefits 
to families to help with the costs of raising children 
have been increased. Combined with the emphasis 
on early childhood education and care as a tool for 
investment rather than a way to mobilize female la-
bour force participation, the result is a lot of part-time 
work among women (Daly 2011; Jenson 2010). From a 
gender perspective, these sorts of changes amount to 
23 We use the term ‘human capital’ here intentionally; it is not quite 
the same as the notion of human capacities used in this paper, 
though there is certainly overlap between the two concepts.
a shift from social welfare claims made on behalf of 
women to claims made on behalf of children (Razavi 
2007). The social value and time burden of women’s 
unpaid work is essentially ignored, and there is no 
real commitment to promoting gender equality in the 
distribution of that work (Daly 2011). 
Evaluated relative to the model developed in this 
paper, the social investment state amounts to an 
attempt to use social and (to a lesser extent) labour 
market policies to create the conditions for wage-led 
altruistic growth by increasing investments in hu-
man capital and breaking the link between current 
poverty or employment instability and those long-
term investments. However, the result for growth 
ultimately depends on the gender distribution of 
social reproduction. If a state is successful in using 
social and labour market policies to push an economy 
into (or maintain, in the case of changing structures 
of production) a wage-led regime, growth may still 
be elusive if the provision of care is constrained by 
the time squeeze associated with a more traditional 
gender division of labour. Maintaining such a division 
between women and men, with the consequence 
that women’s labour market attachment is more 
limited, may help protect the production of human 
capacities, but at the cost of constraining women’s 
contributions to market production and lower overall 
economic growth. Ultimately, growth and distribution 
are inter-related and can work at cross purposes – as 
this analysis makes clear.
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5. 
CONCLUSION
In the spirit of a summary review, Table 5-1 constellates the various economic and social 
welfare structures we discussed in the regimes explained in Table 2-3. Beginning with wage-led 
growth, gender inequality constrains social reproduction and growth through the time squeeze 
channel for both LIAEs and conservative corporatist economies. For LIAEs, low levels of develop-
ment combined with the traditional gender division of labour mean that raising women’s 
incomes as a tool for gender equality is insufficient for delivering the types of investments in 
human capacities that will foster sustainable growth. Similarly, conservative-corporatist social 
welfare states, such as those in continental Europe, are handicapped by the trade-offs women 
often have to make between work and parenthood. The case of France, and its commitment 
to the public provision of care in ways that encourage parents to work and engage in social 
reproduction, illustrates a pathway out of time squeeze and into the mutual case. Here gender 
egalitarian relations of social reproduction make more gender equality in the labour market 
consonant with higher growth, as in the social democratic country group of Northern Europe. 
Turning now to the row of profit-led growth,  increasing 
gender equality in the labour market n the exploita-
tion case threatens both social reproduction and 
growth. For dualistic economies, this tension stems 
from the persistence of women’s traditional roles in 
providing the bulk of care and high levels of inequality. 
Costa Rica has made some headway out of this trap 
through its more universalist approach to social pro-
tection. However, that its growth is profit-led means 
that higher wages for women, while raising social re-
production, may ultimately threaten growth because 
of the extent to which greater equality detracts from 
global competitiveness and profitability – the wage 
squeeze scenario. Liberal AIEs such as the United 
States subsist on exploitative relations of social repro-
duction; in such contexts, greater gender equality in 
the labour market may lower social reproduction and 
growth. Instituting more gender egalitarian relations 
of social reproduction will mean moving to the growth 
instabilities of the wage squeeze case. Simultaneous 
measures that strengthen the link between human 
capacities investment and growth – perhaps by shift-
ing to a more egalitarian growth path – would move 
these exploitative countries towards the mutual case. 
For SIEOs, substantial state and family investments in 
human capital render these economies as intermedi-
ate to the high and low road cases. Where individual 
countries in this group will end up depends on the 
steps that each takes with regard to changes in the 
distribution of social reproduction and whether they 
move towards greater gender egalitarianism (wage 
squeeze) or a feminization of responsibility and obli-
gation (exploitation).
This summary so far focuses primarily on horizontal 
movements across different regimes of social repro-
duction. It is also possible, of course, to move vertically 
between wage- and profit-led growth regimes. Strong 
norms and institutions that support investments in 
care make the wage-led case more likely. Additionally, 
more domestically oriented economies, ones gov-
erned by sustainable employment-generating macro 
policies, support wage-led growth. But the promise of 
these growth paths will be challenged by a low-road 
distribution of social reproduction. Diagonal move-
ments in Table 5-1 involve changing both the supply 
and demand regimes, seemingly a more challenging 
prospect but one that is facilitated by the role of 
care in both growth and the distribution of social 
reproduction. 
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One can imagine a political struggle over social welfare 
policy that encourages both investments in human 
capacities (e.g., instituting free higher education or es-
tablishing a universal right to health care) and a more 
gender egalitarian distribution of social reproduction 
via strong public provisions for care, potentially moving 
an economy along the diagonal from the exploitation 
to the mutual case. A globalizing developing economy 
that seeks to protect its citizens from the volatility of 
global integration by implementing social insurance 
may simply exchange time squeeze for wage squeeze, 
thereby continuing to struggle with finding a sustain-
able path for growth and development.
At the heart of these sorts of policy analyses is the 
point that growth, social reproduction and gender 
equality are connected in ways that make care a key 
determinant of macroeconomic policy outcomes, 
growth and development. Care work is not some-
thing that happens ‘over there’, in the farther flung 
reaches of economic analysis where only feminists 
or the occasional labour economist venture. Social 
reproduction is essential for growth, and the so-
cial and economic circumstances under which it 
takes place determine the precise nature of this 
relationship, as well as chart promising pathways 
for change. 
TABLE 5-1 
Industrial	structure,	growth	and	social	reproduction
Supply:	The	distribution	of	social	reproduction
Demand:	Growth
Low road: Feminization of responsibility  
and obligation (FRO)
High road:
Gender egalitarian (GE)
Wage-led/ altruistic Time squeeze
Low-income agricultural economies
Conservative-corporatist
Mutual
Social democratic
France
Profit-led/ individualistic Exploitation
Dualistic
Liberal advanced industrialized economies
Wage squeeze
Costa Rica
Semi-industrialized export-oriented economies
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